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This thesis is concerned with the phenomenon of Single Party Dominance (SPD) and the 
implications of such a phenomenon on the party system in post-Independence India. 
Specifically, the work is tasked with explaining how dominance can end by providing an 
analytical narrative of a single case of SPD and its collapse. This will be done by examining 
the precipitous decline of the Indian National Congress over a ten-year period from 1967, 
where Congress lost its first state-level elections, to 1977, where the party was finally 











THE SECOND COMING 
W.B. YEATS 
TURNING and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun, 
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
The darkness drops again; but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
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Glossary of Terms 
The All-India Railwaymen's Federation. The train workers union 
responsible for the crippling strike of 1975. See Ch. 6.3.ii 
'Big Men' Local intermediaries at the district or state level. 
An Untouchable 
Defeat Poverty 
Mahatma Gandhi's term for Dalit. Means literally, "the Child of 
God." Considered a pejorative term in contemporary speech. 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act 
A Hindu holy man. 
Movement led by lP Narayan advocating a partyless democracy 
and 'Gandhian Socialism'. See Ch. 6.3.ii 
Single Party Dominance 
The cabal of chief ministers who controlled the Congress party 






















Institutions of Government 
The leader of cabinet and head of state. 
A member of the national cabinet 
Constitutionally the head of the executive, In reality the 
president acts on the advice of the PM and the Council of 
Ministers. 
The "People's Assembly" or lower house of Parliament. 
National representatives elected by common suffrage every 
five years. 
The "Council of States" or upper house of Parliament. 
Consists of members drawn from the state ministries or 
nominated by the President. 
The executive head of a provincial administration 
Serve under the chief minister. 
Official head of a state/province; nominal powers. 
Member of the Legislative Assembly 













Congress Party Organisational Divisions 
The Indian National Congress or simply "Congress" 
Elected by all delegates for a two-year term. 
The All-India Congress Committee. Comprising one eighth of the 
delegates of each province elected by the delegates of each province 
WC The Working Committee. Composed of the President of the 





by the President. 
Pradesh (Provincial) Congress Committee. Party units at the state 
level, made up of many DCCs, and led by a PCC President. 
District Congress Committee. Smallest division of party 
organisation. 
Congress Party in Parliament. Umbrella term for Congress MPs. 
Congress Forum for Socialist Action. Group of radical Congressmen 






















Selection of Parties 
The Indian National Congress (Requisitioned). The victorious 
faction after the 1969 'Great Split'. Colloquially referred to as the 
Ruling Congress. 
The Syndicate-led faction ejected from the Congress after 1969. 
Also known as the Old Congress. 
Communist Party of India 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam or "Dravidian Progressive 
Federation". A Tamil based political organisation. Advocacy of 
Tamil language with separatist tendencies. 
Punjabi party, advocates of Sikh language and religious rights. 
"Shivaji's Army", right-wing Marathi-nationalist organisation in 
Maharashtra. 
Atavistic Hindu chauvinist organisation 
Bharatiya Janata Party, descendent of the Jana Sangh, so named 
since 1980. Reached its height in the 1990s. 
Victorious multi-party alliance of 1977. 
The "People's Front". The victorious coalition in the crucial state 
elections in Gujarat in 13 June 1975, toppling the Congress (R) in 
























1.1. Understanding Single Party Dominance 
1.2. The Indian National Congress: 
Setting & Breaking the Mould of Single Party Dominance 
1.3. Falling From Power 
IA. Timeframe: 1967 to 1977 
1.5. Methodology 
1.1 Understanding Single Party Dominance 
Single Party Dominance (SPD) occurs when a party - by virtue of its historical status, 
its ability to mobilize massive constituencies. and the hegemonic force it exerts over 
the political system - maintains its hold on power for a sustained and uninterrupted 
period of time.! Its position allows the dominant party to influence the institutions of 
government. to control the state apparatus and civil service. the distribution of 
patronage. as well as the style and orientation of the opposition. The party. because of 
its status. at once reflects and shapes the society in which it operates. 
Dominant party systems are the exception to the democratic norm of two- and multi-
party systems in that the dominant party is the centre of decision-making and resource 
distribution in the political system to the exclusion of all other parties. There is a 
distinction between those one-party systems that are autocratic (as is the case in the 
People's Republic of China) and those parties that dominate the political process, but 











still maintain democratic freedoms (such as South Africa under the African National 
Congress)':. For the purposes of this project only the latter type will be considered. 
Other factors contribute to a democratic administration apal1 from the number of 
parties in the party system. The conventional 'Westminster" notion of two parties of 
comparatively equal standing engaging in periodic 'elite swapping' exercises is too 
narrow a definition for what makes democracy work. The vigour of the legislative 
process. holding the executive accountable to its decisions. the assertiveness and 
autonomy of the judiciary - generally a respect for the division of powers among the 
organs of government - these elements are as important as a regular change of 
incumbents. Other criteria include the personal freedoms enjoyed by the citizens. their 
adherence to the rule of law. as well as the strength of civic associational life3 (the 
social bonds that exist between individuals through public participation and 
involvement in non-political activity): and the ultimate authority of the constitution. 
These all contribute to the vibrancy of the system. Democracy can differ in its form 
according to the dictates of the local political culture. but these 'core essentials' have 
to be met. 
In emerging dominant party systems the sustainability of democratic procedures is 
often tenuous and. as Huntington reminds us. there is a danger of slippage: that the 
institutional checks and balances that limit state power are fragile and can easily be 
: A comparative study between the dominant party systems of India and South Africa is undertaken by 
Reddy. T.: "The Congress Party Model: South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and India's 
Indian National Congress (INC) as Dominant Parties." .-I}i"icul1 and .-Isian Studies. -1-( 3): (2005) pp. 271 
-300 
'For a comparati\e study between northern and southern Ital~ on the importance of OOci\ic 
communities" in building democratic institutional strength see: 
Putnam. Robert D.: "!'vlaking Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy" Princeton. N.J.: 











undone.-l The by now cliched warnmg of Lord Acton's that "Power corrupts. but 
absolute power corrupts absolutely" should caution us against un-critically accepting 
a system that risks concentrating decision-making power in the hands of the few. 
There is much debate about whether a true democratic culture can be realized within a 
dominant party system; that the trappings of power might be too all consuming for 
those who wield it. 5 As a result. there is a voluminous literature on whether SPD 
systems are .. the midwife or the gravedigger of democracyT6 Such arguments are 
valid and necessary. but have a bearing on this discussion only insofar as the 
substantive quality of India' s democracy will be judged. However. for present 
purposes. the broader discussion about democratic consolidation will not feature 
strongly. We are merely concerned with the experience of a single organisation in a 
SPD setting. 
Dominance alters the way that competition for power is contested. Despite the regular 
occurrence of free and open elections. the opposition has little occasion to win office 
given the supremacy of the dominant party. The opposition parties are forced to take 
on a peripheral role as participants in the legislative process. holding the incumbent 
government to account but acting from without. However. the notion of "throwing 
-l As Huntington notes. of the Three Waves of democratisation. the first two (of 1828-1926 and 1943-
1962) \\ere followed by reverse waves (1922-1942 and 1958-1975). 
Huntington. Samuel. P.: "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century" Norman 
and London: Uni\ersity of Oklahoma Press (1991 ). 
, Giliomee & Simkins take this position in their comparative study of SPD s; stems in South Africa. 
India. !'vlexico. Tai\\an. !'vlalaysia and Singapore. 
Giliomee. Hermann & Simkins. Charles (eds.) The Awkward Embrace.· One-Parn' Domination and 
Democracy Amsterdam et al.: Harwood Academic Publishers (1999). 
" Spie!3. Clemens: "One-Party-Dominance in Changing Societies: The AC'<C and INC in Comparative 










the rascals ouf" is absent in the SPD system because there is no foreseeable way in 
which their dominance can be overcome. even when they abuse their position.7 
What makes the SPD system so absorbing for students of comparative politics is the 
primacy that is placed upon the internal workings of the party itself. The dominant 
party is the centre of gravity in the political system. The endogenous forces within it 
also shape the external dynamics; for instance in its manipulation of other actors in 
the party system. To study these workings is to come to terms with the complex 
process of internal conflict. the importance of factions.s as well as organisational 
divisions and how individuals compete for a higher place in the party hierarchy. 
1.2. The Indian National Congress: Setting & Breaking the Mould of 
Single Party Dominance 
No party exemplifies this pattern of dominance better than the Indian National 
Congress (INC). From 1947 to 1977 the INC enjoyed unchecked electoral supremacy 
in the national government. a period of three decades of dominance. If. as Harold 
Wilson said. "a week is a long time in politics" then three decades is an eternity. 
Several questions bear asking at this point. How did the Congress manage to maintain 
its dominance for such a length of time? How was the Congress as a liberation 
movement able to make the transformation into a professional party of governance? 
Moreover. hmv do the historical associations of the movement transcend the usual 
notion of parties as purely instrumental interest aggregators to become embodiments 
. Kothari. Rajni.: "The Congress 'System' in India" .-Isian Survey. Vol. ·L No. 12. (Dec .. 1964). p.1 161 












of the national consensus. whose fate is tied to the development of the new nation? 
These questions are important because they ask us to interrogate an unusual 
phenomenon and how it is perpetuated. But there is a more compelling question. and 
that concerns the eventual decline of the dominant party. 
1.3. Falling From Power 
Nothing lasts forever and neither do dominant parties. As Duverger notes: 
Domination takes the zest from political life. simultaneously bringing stability. 
The dominant party wears itself out in office. it loses its vigour. its arteries 
harden. It would thus be possible to show ... that every domination bears within 
itself the seeds of its own destruction.9 
During the period under review. Congress went through a variety of internal changes 
and was subject to overwhelming forces from without - a combination of 
countervailing tendencies which ultimately led it to lose power. Just what does 
Duverger mean when he talks about the dominant party containing the seeds of its 
own destruction? What, to continue his metaphor. are those seeds? How do they 
germinate and grow into such a self-destructive force? 
If. as Pempel suggests. there is a virtuous cycle of dominance. a self-perpetuating 
trend of increased and deepening supremacy.IO then we need to explain why this cycle 
loses momentum and leads the party to eventually fall. The driving question in our 
discussion is this: how and why did the Congress decline? What sequence of events 
q Dun:rger. fVl.: "Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activit:- in the fVlodern State". (2d ed: 
London: 1vlethuen. 1959) cited in A.rian. A. & Barnes. S.H.: "The Dominant Part:- System: A Neglected 
1vlodel of Democratic Stability" The Journal a/Polifics. Vol. 36. No.3. (Aug .. I 97··n. pp. 308-9. 











and political dynamics led to the withering away of Congress hegemony and the loss 
of the first national elections in 1977? 
1.4. Timeframe: 1967 to 1977 
The period 1967 to 1977 is commonly seen as one of flux. and ultimately. of the 
collapse of the party system in place since Independence. Several events occurred 
during this period which precipitated the Congress decline and this decade is the most 
eventful in the party's time as a ruling organisation. 
History affords us the benetit of hindsight. and it is easy to observe the Congress 
decline as something of an inevitability. As the following chapters show. there is a 
distinct chronology that illustrates the moments of decline in successive stages. The 
chapters correspond roughly in terms of these thematic stages and thus adhere to the 
sequential order of the events as they played themselves out. Although the teleological 
trajectory of the Congress decline is easily observable. the danger is that one could 
lapse into a descriptive account that presents the sequence without critically 
scrutinizing it. Therefore. time will serve as an organisational unit for the ordering of 
key developments within the party and in the party system. However. the end goal is 
not to determine the question of time. of when precisely the Congress fell. The object 
is rather to determine causality, in an attempt to understand why Congress slipped 
from its golden throne. 
Chapter 2 will begin the discussion by presenting the available literature on SPD. This 











dominance. as well as the effect that such a phenomenon has on the democratic 
system. The focus of the research is on dominant party decline. so a section of this 
chapter will be devoted to the competing theories of how this happens. 
Chapter 3 will explain the nature of the 'Congress System' as conceived by Rajni 
Kothari II and developed by W.H. Morris-Jones 1:2 and others. This will require a 
detailed account of Congress dominance as well as a discussion of its history before 
the decade in question. The period prior to 1967 saw the premiership of Nehru (from 
Independence in 1947 until his death in 1964) forming the fulcrum upon which 
Congress dominance turned. Nehru's premiership was characterized by vigorous 
support for the nascent democratic institutions. a disproportionate respect for the 
opposition parties and an adherence to the spirit and letter of the constitution and its 
egalitarian principles. Added to this was Nehru's tireless work to promote the values 
of secularism. socialism and non-alignment in international atTairs.13 His death 
created a vacuum. precipitating a succession crisis within the ruling party. The 
question' After Nehru. who?' was answered when Lal Bahadur Shastri was elevated 
to prime minister. However. Shastri's reign was cut short by his own death in 1966 
and the ascendance of Indira Gandhi. Nehru's daughter. was to follow shortly 
thereafter. To discuss how she rose to power is to illuminate the decision-making style 
of the Congress and its ability to exercise 'collective leadership' over its supporters 
and the nation - an increasingly precarious process as the schisms in the party 
deepened. 
II Kothari. "The Congress 'System' in India" 
I: \Iorris-Jones. V..H~: "The"Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance" .\/odern .Isian Stl/dies. 
Vol. 1. No.2. (1967). pp. 109-132. 











The general election of 1967 is where our timeframe begins: it is the earliest under 
Indira Gandhi and the most significant for the party since Independence. These 
elections saw Congress for the first time losing in at least halfofthe state legislatures. 
The once unassailable dominance the organisation enjoyed in these regions was now 
broken. and the divisions within the party were exposed. The fallout from these losses 
and the issues that caused them will be discussed in Chapter 4. Although the Congress 
retained its national majority. its stature as a dominant party was compromised. 
Academic and journalistic accounts of the time highlight the tensions within the ruling 
party. Added to the pressures from below - of regional movements coalescing around 
ethnic. linguistic and caste constituencies challenging the Congress government in the 
Centre in New Delhi - the defeats marked the beginning of a gradual unravelling of 
Congress control over the political system. 
Endogenous factors within the party also contributed to the loosening of its hold on 
pO\ver. In this light. the events of 1969 are telling. In Chapter 5 we look at the 
competing factions and contestations over the ideological trajectory of the party which 
led to the first split in Congress in November of that year. As a party renowned for its 
ability to accommodate a multitude of different interests. Congress had been 
described as an "open umbrella:· 14 However. the consensus that existed during the 
Nehru period was no longer sustainable, and Chapter 5 will evaluate how this came to 
be. What caused the consensus-seeking function to deteriorate to such an extent as to 
lead to a split? The events and personalities involved in this haemorrhage will be dealt 
with in terms of their relative positions and a detailed description of the two factions 
\vill follow. The Indira Gandhi-led Congress (R) and Congress (0). headed by an 
l-l Roy. Ramashra): "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State" Asia/1 SlirveL Vol. 8. No. 











association of party bosses known as the Syndicate. are the two rival groups in this 
contest. Understanding the victory of the one faction over the other will be the main 
concern of Chapter 5. 
The 1970s were some of the most turbulent years in the history of modem India. and 
the deprivation and economic turmoil of the time were mirrored by political upheaval. 
Chapter 6 primarily addresses the slide towards authoritarianism that characterized the 
first half of the 1970s. This period is notable for two events: The elections of 1971. 
\vhich saw a surge in popular support for the new Congress (R) under the leadership 
of Mrs. Gandhi. and the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1975. This chapter 
\vill evaluate the social and political conditions of these years. How. in such a short 
space of time, could Mrs. Gandhi's vindication at the polls crumble in the way that it 
did. and what explanations can we attribute to her actions? The many abuses of 
authority during the Emergency will be examined. and some discussion will take 
place on the et1ects of the suspension of the fundamental rights of privacy, press 
freedom and habeas corpus. The clamp-down on opposition parties and the 
implications that this had for the political culture of the period will also be discussed. 
The Emergency is one of India's darkest hours and the threat of institutionalised 
authoritarianism has never been more apparent. Chapter 7 discusses how this moment 
of virtual dictatorship came to an end. Firstly. what led Mrs. Gandhi to withdraw the 
Emergency after so many of the constitutional provisions had been suspended? Why. 
from her position of relative advantage, did she throwaway her power by declaring 
elections in 1977? The mobilization of large numbers of people in widespread civil 











crucial events of this time. A disparate group of opposition parties which had been 
unable to unite previously. but who consolidated their support at the critical juncture, 
lanata were able to constitute India' s first non-Congress government. It was a short-
lived exercise. but long enough to restore suspended freedoms and transfonn the SPD 
system into a multi-party one. New party systems usually emerge from the rubble of a 
major social or political upheaval. Chapter 7 provides an account of such a break from 
the past. 
It will also be necessary to examine some of the events of the period immediately 
before and after the three decades in question. Many of the internal mechanisms 
\vithin Congress will have to be explained. especially the delicate process in place 
during the Nehru years. In order for us to better understand the Congress collapse, it is 
vital that we come to tenns with what kept it together for such a length of time. If we 
can identify the initial strengths of the system. we can go some way towards 
understanding its deterioration. What will emerge is that far from being a system 
based on the fortitude of circumstance or historical eventuality. Congress was 
dominant due to the deliberate machinations of a diligent party leadership. The party 
was flexible enough to be able to incorporate emergent sectional interests in society 
whilst simultaneously maintaining the stability of the statlls quo. 
Returning to the timeframe question, it is also necessary to give an account of what 
the party system evolved into after the first national defeat of the Congress: that is. 
after 1977. Although Congress has occupied government on several occasions since 
its historic loss they have not enjoyed the same dominant position as before. The INC 











opposition parties to fonn alliances in order to do so. In the 1980s Congress was the 
biggest actor in a genuine multi-party system with the opposition fonning coalition 
governments for several years at a time. In the 1990s and into this decade. Congress 
operated in a two-party system, with the virulently Hindu nationalist movement the 
Bharatiya lanata Party (BlP), as their principal opponents. Today it is back to a 
multiparty environment. The system has changed and the party of the 1960s and 70s is 
far different from the party as we see it today. Unfortunately. the changes in the 
political and social character of the country are too broad and fundamental to account 
for here. and this will only be done in passing. 
The concluding chapter of the thesis will hope to re-present some of the lessons 
gleaned from the Congress party during this most eventful of decades. In order to be 
successful this project needs to have shown several things. Of course. a clear 
explanation of the sequence of events leading up to the loss of 1977 should be given. 
An account of the authoritarian period is also essential. because it illustrates how 
badly these systems can go awry if their mediatory mechanisms are allowed to stall. 
Mostly. however, the project should provide a catalogue of explanations for Congress 
decline though an analytically comprehensive narrative. 
1.5. Methodology 
The project concerns a point In time long past. in a far off country. that places 
limitations on the writing of the thesis. Although primary texts are scarce. this has not 
proved to be an obstacle. as they are not directly relevant for this specific topic. 











explanations for Congress decline. The question IS not a new one. but it is 
nevertheless important to explore it once more. The intention is not to re-tell the story 
of Congress dominance. but to understand the case at hand in order to make 
generalisable claims about the way dominant parties behave when their power is 
threatened. The benetit of this case is that of hindsight. for unlike many other 
dominant party systems, dominance in India has risen and fallen. allowing for more 
definitive conclusions to be made. 
The author also travelled extensively throughout India from November 2006 to 
February 2007 in which time many individuals were consulted and books read 
concerning the subject. Several informal interviews were conducted with scholars 
during this time. but they will not be cited officially in the present document. 











2. THE THEORY OF SINGLE PARTY DOMINANCE: 
SURVEYING THE LITERATURE 
2.1. The Purpose of Theory 
2.2. Defining Single Party Dominance 
2.3. Why Do Dominant Parties Decline? 
2.1. The Purpose of Theory 
The objective of Chapter 2 is to outline the theoretical limitations of the thesis and to 
show the body of material that will be drawn upon to inform its analytical position. 
The chapter will have two specific concerns. The first is to define the term "Single 
Party Dominance" (SPD). This was partially addressed in the introduction. but further 
conceptual clarity over what SPD is (and is not) is needed before the study 
commences. An appreciation for how a dominant party remains in power, and what 
strategies it uses to maintain its dominant position. is required. However. it is the 
failure to sustain these features of dominance over the long term that drives this 
investigation. and which will be the specific concern of section 2.3. The section will 
examine the literature on dominant party decline as discussed in the theoretical 
formulations of several scholars whose work has shaped the discourse on the subject. 
This chapter and Chapter 3 will serve as the foundation for the thesis. Chapters 4 to 7 
\vill look at the trajectory of Congress decline beginning in 1967 and culminating in 
1977. whilst Chapter 8 will tie these strands together to determine causality. But 
before exploring the decade in question several factors need to be accounted for. 











dominant parties eventually fall. Chapter 3 follows with a discussion of how Congress 
fulfils this model. and offers some formative opinions on why it lost its dominant 
position. 
2.2. Defining Single Party Dominance 
When discussing the notion of Single Party Dominance it is important to clarify that 
the focus is on dominant party systems in democratic regimes. and not authoritarian 
one-party systems where state power rules supreme. Some cases of SPD systems 
include the ANC in South Africa (l994-today). Mexico' s Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PR!) from 1917-2000. the Mapai party in Israel (an ancestor of today's 
Labour Party: 1948-77). Other examples include Italy's Christian Democrats. the 
Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan from 1948-2000. as well as Sweden's Social 
Democrats and the Liberal Democrats of Japan (1955-93).15 
Unlike in one-party states. opposition parties are allowed to compete for power in 
SPD systems. 16 Their representation may be paltry. but the opposition has the benefit 
of legal protection. and its existence and participation is ensured through regular and 
free elections based on universal suffrage. In these elections citizens make informed 
choices about their representatives, but tend to repeatedly favour a single organisation. 
In addition to this. the importance of the basic civil liberties of expression and 
association is respected. There is also universal equality before the law and a formal 
I' Schneider. S.G. & Abedi. A.: ··Winning is Not Enough: A Reconceptualization of Single-Party 
Dominance in Established Democracies·· Paper for presentation at the CPSA Annual General Meeting 
in Toronto. ON (June 1-3.2(06). p.13 
1(, Jacob. Suraj: ··lnstitutional Change in the Congress Party: An Application of the Greif·Laitin 











separation of the organs of state with the triumvirate of the legislative. executive and 
judicial bodies all enjoying autonomy and oversight capacity. These elements serve to 
limit the dominant party's exercise of power and help to check potential authoritarian 
tendencies. However. the depth of these countries' democratic commitment is 
sometimes variable. 17 
Bearing in mind the above examples and common features. what constitutes 
dominance in the first place and how is dominance maintained? The French theorist 
Maurice Duverger (1959) attempts to define the concept by examining the peculiar 
character of dominant parties and their relationship with the polity. His observations 
are captured in the following quote: 
A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, 
ideas. methods. its style. so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch ... 
Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength: it is also linked 
with belief. A dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be 
dominant ... Even the enemies of the dominant party. even citizens who refuse 
to give it their vote. acknowledge its superior status and its influence; they 
deplore it but admit it. IS 
Although Duverger avoids specitying what constitutes dominant party systems. he 
does refer to an ethos that accompanies SPD. He shows how closely the dominant 
party depends upon the creation of an historical consensus or an ·epoch·. Not every 
party with a parliamentary majority held over a long period will automatically be 
considered a dominant party.19 Rather, to be dominant requires an intimate association 
betvveen the party and the very structures of society and. in most cases. an active 
I" For e:xample. in the: case: of Taiwan unde:r the: KMT the: opposition was tightly regulatt:d and. for a 
period. formal opposition was disallowe:d. However. this \\as an inte:rim phase: whe:reb) the: dominant 
party oversaw the transition to a more procedural multi-party system. A similar sense of "stewardship" 
characterized the PRI in Mexico with the transformation from hegemonic part) to single-party 
dom inant democracy being accompanied by manipulation of ele:ctoral rules and tight control over 
unionized labour by that organisation. 
Ibid. 












participation in a project of nation building. This is the case with former liberation 
d . "() I . movements turne governIng parties (INC. ANCt" as \ve I as transitIOnal 
arrangements from soft- or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes to multiparty 
democracies (PRJ. KMT). 
Pempel (1990) outlines four characteristics that a party must exhibit in order to be 
classified as dominant. Pempe\"s model is more focused than Duverger"s and his work 
is useful in that it shows a level of theoretical parsimony. providing specific criteria 
for what constitutes a party's dominance. 
The first criterion Pempel offers is an obvious one: that the party should be 
numerically superior and enjoy an electoral majority to secure its dominance. In other 
words the party must be dominant in number.21 In order to capture state power the 
party must enjoy a majority of the electorate's support. By positioning itself as the 
arbiter of the aggregate interests of society. the party acquires the strength of numbers 
in parliament to legislate its wishes. Fragile majorities or coalitions of opportunity set 
limits on a party"s behaviour in office. A dominant party should be unencumbered by 
such concerns. 
Secondly. if the party wishes to be dominant it must place itself in a dominant 
"" bargaining position with regards to other political actors in the party system.--
Whether the dominant party is the sole party in office or the key actor in a broad 
alliance should not change the fact that it is the most influential organisation. dictating 
the terms of interaction with other parties. 
:0 Reddy,,'The Congress Party Moder'. p.25 
:1 Pempe!. pp. 3 & 16 











If a party has a large amount of organisational strength, but is only in power on an ad 
hoc basis, its ability to dominate the political system is stunted, Therefore, the third 
criterion is that the party must be dominant chronologically,~3 Especially if it wishes 
to implement its historical agenda the dominant party needs to spend a great deal of 
time in office,~4 
Fourthly, Pempel highlights the need for the party to be dominant governmentally, 
This means that the party must control government institutions in such a way as to 
maximise its access to resources and its ability to distribute patronage.25 In this way, 
the implementation of the party's historical agenda depends largely on its capacity to 
use instruments of state to exert its wil1.26 This in turn continues to bolster the party's 
image amongst the electorate as 'the party of the nation'. 
An idea that emerges from the work of Arian & Barnes (1 974i7 and others28 is of the 
dominant party as a microcosm of the broader society, reflecting its values and inner 
tensions. Purely majoritarian parties are often supported by ethnic racial blocs and 
exploit demographic divisions to force their will on smaller actors and marginal 
groups. However, a dominant party can also serve as the 'glue,29 that holds together 
:3 Ibid .. p.-l 
:~ Ibid .. p.16. 
2' Kothari. R.: "The Congress System Revisited: A Decennial Review" .-isia/1 Surver. Vol. I~. No. 12. 
(Dec .. 197~). p. 1038 
:6 Pt:mpel. p.16 
:- Arian. /l.,.. & Barnes. S.H.: "The Dominant Party System: A Neglected tvlodei of Democratic 
Stability" The Journal o/Politics. Vol. 36. No.3. (Aug .. 197~) 
:8 Jacob. p.2: 
Joshi. R & Desai. K.: "Towards a More Competitive Party System in India" Asian SlIrvev. Vol. 18. No. 
II. (NO\ .. 1978). p. 1097 
:0 Rimanelli. Marco: "Introduction - Peaceful Democratization Trends in Single-Party-Dominant 
Countries" in Rimanclli. Marco (cd): Comparative Democrati:.ation and Peacejit! Change in Single-











the constituent parts of a highly fractured society. Because of its broad social base. the 
dominant party becomes home to the whole spectrum of different political beliefs, 
creating an internal network of interest groups. sheltering "many contradictory 
outlooks and countervailing influences:·3o Arian & Barnes describe the composition 
of this glue as follows: 
Cohesion emerges from the mutual desire to share the fruits of power. a desire 
sufficiently strong to hold extreme demands in check and to moderate 
potentially disintegrative tendencies. In this respect and in others the dominant 
party is a microcosm of a partially pluralist society. Its factions reflect the 
divisions of the society; its internal decision-making processes are. in effect. 
identical with those of the polity. and since they are. the close identification 
between party and polity is reinforced in the public mind. 31 
As a result. the development of factions becomes an inevitable and necessary bi-
product of the SPD system. Because of the marginal role of the opposition. politics 
increasingly comes to depend upon intraparty co-ordination (of sectional interests and 
demands). rather than on interparty co-ordination.32 Given the weakness of the 
opposition. factions can provide an effective substitute for external political party 
competition. acting as miniature 'parties' within the broader organisation.33 The 
existence of competing entities within the dominant party essentially serves the 
consensus-driven aim of accommodating the divergent tendencies of the body politic 
as a whole.3-l 
Now that we have established what SPD is. the question of how to maintain this 
dominance naturally follows. How does the dominant party preserve itself in office 
and fulfil the criteria of longevity and continuity? 
30 Joshi & Desai. p.1 097 
11 Arian & Barnes. p.602 
32 N) able. p.8 
33 Hanson. A.H. & Douglas. J.: India's Democracy Weidenfeld and ~icolson (197:2). p.67 
34 Belloni. F,P. & Beller. D.C.: "The Study of Party Factions as Competitive Political Organisations" 











As Pempel notes, "Dominance ... involves an interrelated set of mutually reinforcing 
processes that have the potential to beget even more dominance".35 This 
interrelationship he terms the 'virtuous cycle of dominance'. The cycle is perpetuated 
by continually reinventing the basis for the party's support: concentrating on 
absorbing new social forces and interest groups into the ambit of the dominant party. 
At the same time however. the dominant party seeks stability, and the maintenance of 
the status quo is an important element to the party's success. In other words, "the 
party must be rigid enough to hold on to key supporters for long, but flexible enough 
to replace this loyal core:,36 Pempel notes that this seemingly "intellectually fuzzy" 
contradiction is one of the crucial elements of the dominant party's success. John 
Stuart Mill's famous observation that healthy political systems will contain both "a 
party of order and stability" matched with a "party of progress or reform" is 
seemingly contradicted by the phenomenon of SPD.37 However. further reading of 
Mill reveals that this could alter when .. the one or the other shall have so enlarged its 
mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and 
distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away:,38 It is 
this form of 'dynamic conservatism' that keeps the party in a dominant position and 
on a centrist path. 
Consequently, Pempel asserts that dominance is about more than only winning 
consecutive elections. To understand SPD is to see beyond the make-up of 
organisations or the fluctuations of the party system, but to observe how dominant 
" Pempel. p.16 
.ib Pempel. p.3~O 













parties create and sustain regimes. In this way. the party's influence seeps into every 
facet of civic life and becomes. to borrow Gramsci's term. a 'hegemonic force', 
exercising active control as well as "soft power" to enforce consensus.39 
2.3. Why Do Dominant Parties Decline? 
Having deliberated on the general characteristics of SPD and its implications it is 
necessary to examine the literature on dominant party decline. In order to trace the 
experience of Congress dominance in India. as well as its fall. some possible 
explanations for SPD decline will now be considered. 
Although dominant parties seem to occupy an unassailable position. their high status 
can be misleading. Arian & Barnes remind us that "Dominant parties carry a large 
baggage of historical. ideological. and organisational commitments that set real limits 
on their freedom of manoeuvre:·40 Although the dominant party can to some extent 
manipulate these boundaries there are still I imits set on its behaviour. Step outside of 
those boundaries and the dominant position can easily be lost. In order to avoid this 
the dominant party must "adjust to the changes in society. and the greater the 
fragmentation of the society the greater the difficulty it experiences in doing SO:·41 
39 Bates. T.R.: "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony" Journal a/the History of Ide as. Vol. 36. No.2. 
(Apr. - Jun .. 1975). p.352 
"The concept of hegemony is really a very simple one. It means political leadership based on the 
consent of the led. a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world vie\\ of 
the ruling class'" 












This chapter has often discussed the work of Duverger. and he has much to say about 
the decline of dominant parties. Drawing on Hatschek-l2. Duverger outlines the two 
primary reasons for the disintegration of the dominant party. Firstly, the pressures of 
occupying office for a long time "compels a party to attenuate its programme and not 
to fulfil completely the promises made to its electors:·-I3 This alienates the voters and 
drives many of them toward the opposition parties. slowly tipping the scales of 
support against the dominant party.-I-I Secondly. the dominant party experiences 
internal fragmentary tendencies when in power for too long with antagonism often 
developing between "an intransigent left wing and a temporising right wing:·-I) In 
opposition a party can be less concerned with such internal strife. as its dedication to 
replacing the incumbent party provides a unity of purpose and an impetus to resolve 
internal disputes. However. in the case of the dominant party, the "struggle for the 
soul of the party"' can lead to a trend of internal fragmentation that is detrimental to its 
long-term success.-I6 This ossification can be borne out of the lack of a formidable 
challenger, which leads to complacency and. eventually. the party's demise.47 
Although the classical conception is that the opposition poses the direct challenge to 
the incumbent's power, it is the internal dynamic of the dominant party that provides 
the biggest threat to their continuance in office. For Duverger. it is clear that "[just] as 
the decline of Rome was attributable to endogenous political forces. so is the decline 
f d · .. -18 o a ommant party . 
.)e Hatscheck "Englische Verassungsgeschichte··. Berlin. 1913 qllofed in Duverger. p.300 
,)3 Duwrger. p.300 
.).) Thackrah. Simon: "Unpacking One-party Dominance" Annual Conference of the Australasian 
Political Studies Association. Australian National University. Canberra. ACT. (-+-6 October 20(0). p. 3 
.)< 
. DU\erger. p.30 I 
.)" Ibid .. p.300 
.)- Jacob. p.2 
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Rajni Kothari (1974) uses the endogenous/exogenous typology when discussing the 
decline in the dominant party's popularity.-+9 Echoing Duverger. Kothari locates the 
primary independent variable affecting decline in the internal sphere: the erosion of 
the dominant party's strength from within. This division. which can deepen into a 
schism or a split eventually plays to the advantage of the opposition. resulting in 
IOSS.50 The exogenous independent variable on the other hand. takes the form of direct 
challenge from the opposition. i.e. a movement that generates from without beyond 
the scope of the dominant party's influence. If the adversaries are able to unite against 
the dominant party a real threat can be made against its strength. 51 Kothari' s work 
reveals that when trying to comprehend the dependent variable of dominant party 
collapse there is a propensity to focus on the endogenous factors as the origins of 
decline. Although there is still concern with exogenous factors the changes therein 
have their beginnings within the dominant party's internal strife and contradictions. 
Benjamin Nyable (2004) in his study on the institutional changes in the Congress also 
does this. Drawing on the work of Riker. he provides a noteworthy contribution to the 
albeit small literature on SPD decline. Nyable continues the emphasis that Duverger 
and Kothari put on endogenous political factors and how they lead to the breakdown 
of the dominant party. He attributes the party's dominance to its ability to occupy a 
central ideological position on the political spectrum. The parties of the left and right. 
he says. despite their shared opposition to the centrist organisation in power. cannot 
bring themselves to unite on a common ideological platform.52 As long as this 
fragmentation exists in the opposition ranks. the dominant party's good fortune will 
-l" Kothari "The Congress System Revisited: A Decennial Review" 
<f) b'·' 10 I,., - . - I lu .. p. "t_ 
<I Ibid. 











continue. However. there is a flipside. "Implicitly. the end of dominance could occur 
\vhen the left and right succeed in allying against the centre:·53 This could only 
happen if the dominant party ceases to maintain its centrist position: conceivably. if 
the dominant party's fragmentary tendencies produce a polarizing ideological schism 
within. If the party .. tilts" towards a certain ideological position this might jeopardize 
its dominance. With Nyable we see a continuation of the typology used by Duverger 
and Kothari. by putting primacy on the fluctuations within the party. However. there 
is more of an explicit explanation for how these internal changes affect the dominant 
party's relationships at the interparty level. 
Thus. the role of the opposition becomes incidental to the workings within the 
dominant party. Edward Shills (1960) notes that the despondency of the opposition 
\'"hen faced with the dominant party forces them into retreat.5" "Meanwhile. the 
dominant party. through long tenure in office grows "soft" and perhaps "corrupt" :.55 
The inability of the dominant party to meet the ever-changing needs of the populace 
leads to disaffection and anomie. In due course. the party will lose power and 
subsequently break down and disintegrate. The disintegration for Shills occurs after 
the fall from power (here there is divergence with the previous theorists in that they 
see the internal disintegration occurring beforehand). Shills sees this dissolution as 
detrimental to the unity of the nation. Because the dominant party has come to fashion 
itself so carefully as the builder of that nation. its absence leaves a void in its place. 
The void is only partially filled by a disorderly opposition who serve narrow 
constituencies and lack the same unifYing ability of the dominant party. 
'3 Ibid. 
q Shiis. Ed\\ard.: "Political Development in the Ne\\ States" Cumparati\'e Studies ill Societv and 












Lastly. there are the external variables that lie beyond the realm of party politics. 
These are the "known unknowns" of economic flux. changes in the international 
environment and the sociological developments that alter the playing field for or 
against the dominant party. War, famine, natural disaster: all these can radically affect 
the perception of the dominant party's ability to govern. and lie beyond its range of 
control. 
The objective of this thesis is to address which of these processes - institutional 
decay. intraparty fragmentation, or consolidation of the opposition - occurred first in 
the SPD system in India. and which held the most significance. Given what we know 
about SPD and the theoretical work on SPD decline. some understanding of how this 
complex organisation operated in the Indian context will be dealt with in Chapter 3. 
Thereafter. how the party eventually became a victim of its own success will form the 











3. THE INDIAN CASE 
3.1. The 'Congress System' 
3.2. The Congress Hierarchy & the Federal Diffusion of Power 
3.3. Organisational vs. Governmental Wings 
3.4. Towards an Understandin.g of Congress Decline 
"The Congress is the country and the country is Congress" 
- .!awaharlal lVehru56 
3.1. The 'Congress System' 
The Indian National Congress is the classic example of a dominant party at work. It 
embodied many of the tendencies discussed in Chapter 2 in that it was dominant in 
number and in its bargaining position, it ruled in a chronological fashion. and 
efTectively controlled the instruments of state to maintain its dominance over a long 
period of time. Congress had all of this for thirty long years: from Independence in 
1947 until its first national loss in 1977. 
One of the leading theorists of the Congress Party, and of SPD more generally. is 
Rajni Kothari (1964.1967.1974). His term for SPD in India. the 'Congress System', 
refers to the complex set of procedures and the distribution of power within the Indian 
party system, and the role of Congress' dominance as a democratising agent in that 
system. 











According to Kothari's formulation. the Congress System consists of a party of 
consensus. in this case the dominant Indian National Congress. as well as parties of 
pressure. 57 The parties of pressure (the opposition) function outside of the sphere of 
government. holding electoral minorities and no direct access to power. Nevertheless. 
these parties operate in a cooperative space that Kothari terms the margin of 
pressure. 58 The margin is the division between the parties of consensus and pressure, 
but it also serves as the contact point for a range of actors in the political system. all of 
whom are linked through an elaborate network of "various social groups and leader-
client relationships:·59 It is here, on the margin. that the parties of pressure seek to 
influence the various factions and interest groups within the party of consensus, 
pressurizing pliable sectors of the incumbent elite to promote their own interests. 
Kothari notes that ultimately ... [the] sensitivity of the entire system depends on the 
sensitivity of the margin of pressure, its flexibility and general responsiveness being a 
function of the elbow room it provides to factions, dissident groups and opposition 
parties in the making of critical choices and dec isions:·6o 
Despite its dominant position, however, the party of consensus is by no means 
invulnerable. Although Kothari assumes that the party of consensus is attuned to the 
popular sentiments of the public, there is nevertheless a latency factor at play, the 
distant possibility that the opposition may one day emerge victorious. According to 
Kothari. this serves as a constant reminder to the dominant party not to exercise 
decisions unilaterally or abuse its power. lest it be booted out.61 
,- Kothari: "The Congress 'System' in India" p.1162 
<B Ibid. 
") Ibid .. p. I 163 












As discussed in Chapter 2, the intra-party dynamics of the party serve an important 
function by acting as a political sub-system within which the conflict of factions and 
the competing demands of interest groups were tolerated in order to "prevent them 
from colliding with the party's grand design for power:'6~ Kothari speaks of the 
flourishing factional life that existed within the party of consensus as a "regulatory 
thermostat:' The thermostat responds to the agitations of the parties of pressure, 
incorporating a wide range of actors and perspectives in a continual process of 
adjustment and accommodation.63 In this system the majority position would not 
always triumph. Instead, dissenting voices were encouraged as they added to the 
vitality of the party. In this way, the party came to serve as an "agglomeration" of 
miscellaneous social groups through bargaining and coalition-making instead of an 
"aggregation" of interests in the classical Western conception.6-+ 
The 'Congress System' sought to link these structural processes - the "operative 
mechanics of the system,·65 - with the historical mission of building the new nation.66 
Congress's central role in this mission was facilitated by the distribution of authority 
between centre and state, the allocation of resources. and the emergence and 
absorption of new social groups into the system.67 Kothari reminds the reader that. 
"[to] think of the system merely in terms of aggregation of votes and seats is a gross 
misunderstanding:·68 For the Congress System is not merely a political system, but an 
b: Roy. p.559 
63 Kothari. Rajni: "Continuity and Change in India's Party System" . .Jsian Survey. Vol.IO. No. I I. 
Elections and Party Politics in India: A Symposium. (Nov .. I 970). p. 939 
6~ Ibid: 
Palmer. N.D.: The Indian Political.~vslel71 Houghton l'vliftlin Compan) (1971). p. 208 
6' Kothari. "The Congress System Revisited" p. 1036 
66 Jacob. pA 












explanatory framework for the relationship between the party and society - and its 
mediation in the divides and stratifications of that society.69~7o 
Certainly. Congress's role as an historical agent of nation-building was also lent 
enonnous credibility by its prominence as the leading organisation in India's struggle 
for independence from British colonial rule. The nationalist agenda that it embodied 
during the struggle remained long into independence. A product of this association 
was that Congress was able to attract the highest calibre of individuals to its 
leadership ranks, giving it a significant advantage when it came to forming a 
government. The statesmanship and intellect of Jawaharlal Nehru and the 
organisational ability of Vallahbai Patel contributed to the party's success in 
government. Added to this was the contribution of countless Congressmen. whose 
personal sacrifices for the movement resonated strongly with the populace, giving the 
Congress an advantage that could not be matched by the opposition. Another asset 
was the towering moral legacy of Mahatma Gandhi. His association as the 'father' of 
modem India would be promoted at every opportunity. Few remember Gandhi's 
suggestion that the Congress be dissolved at Independence. as it had served its 
function as a force for liberation.71 
b9 Ibid. p. 1035 
70 Palmer. "The Indian Political System" p. 208 
-] Gandhi's argument for Congress to serve as a Lok Sevak Sangh. or social service league. was seen as 
inconsistent v\ith the needs of modern India and was mostly discarded after his death. HO\vever. his 
Panchayati Ruj or the vast decentralised system of village republics \\as revi\ ed. and from the 1960s 
has sen ed as a vital component of local administration. 
Vora R. & Palshikar. S. (eds): "Introduction" in Indian DelllocracT - J/eanings and Practices. Sage 











3.2. The Congress Hierarchy and the Federal Diffusion of Power 
One of the pillars of Congress dominance was that party structures were divided in 
such a way as to parallel state and local administrative divisions, vertically devolving 
decision-making power within the organisation in a form of internal federalism. 72 
Although Congress was dominant nationally. its dominance was based on its close 
links to 17 relatively autonomous state systems. These consisted of separate Congress 
organisations. each dominant in its own regional system and exhibiting unique 
features. 73 
In his epochal work on party building and organisation, Myron Weiner (1967) 
discusses the structural dynamics of Congress during its golden period of dominance 
(or what is referred to as the ·First Party System· of 1947-67). Weiner asserts that 
given the plural nature of Indian society and the proliferation of diverse sectional 
groups in the political arena. the national organisation could not survive without 
responding to the parochial demands of local interest associations across the 
country.7-t At the district and state levels Congress was tailored to meet these specific 
demands: 
Seen from one viewpoint. Congress is not a single party. but a coalition of 
party organisations. The state party organisation can be viewed as a coalition 
of quasi-independent district organisations. and the national party. as a 
coalition of state party organisations.75 
-: Weiner. !\(:Ton.: Party Building in a .\e\l' Yation - The Indian Yational Congress. University of 
Chicago Press (1967). pA63 
-, Brass. P.: ··Coalition Politics in North India·· The .1merican Political Science Review. Vol. 62. No.4. 
(Dec .. 1968). p.1 175 












This resulted in a pyramidical relationship, with the districts forming the broad base. 
and authority ascending upwards to the state and national levels. Power was thus 
diffused through the Congress hierarchy between the Provincial or "Pradesh" 
Congress Committees (PCCs). themselves consisting of dozens of District Congress 
Committees (OCCs). the smallest unit of party organisation. The PCCs were 
consolidated into the All-India Congress Committee (A ICC). the nationwide 
leadership organ of the Congress. The AICC discussed and issued key policy 
directives for the party organisation. The apex of this pyramid was the Working 
Committee (WC). consisting of the party president and 20 members of the AICC (7 
elected and 13 appointed by the President). Colloquially referred to as the "High 
Command .. 76• the WC generally allowed a level of autonomy for party organisations 
at the lower levels to determine their own atTairs. concerning itself more with the 
daily demands of co-ordinating a vast party machinery. debating policy issues and 
. . h 77 engagIng WIt government. 
As each state consisted of its own regional. ethnic. caste and linguistic associations, 
Congress had to attract local constituents and appeal to issues relevant to their 
particular experience. This was made possible by the mirroring of the party structure 
with the federal divisions of the system of government78 • which were demarcated 
according to language (e.g. the state of Maharashthra for Marathi speakers) or geo-
political concentrations (such as the Punjab which has a majority of Sikhs, and 
proliferation of Punjabi speakers). By allocating state governmental positions and 
distributing revvards to 'local bosses', the central leadership could. in tum. depend on 
the consistent delivery of these voter banks come election time. This enabled 
~" Palmer. "The Indian Political System". p.214 
~7 Kochanek. "The Congress Party of India". pp. I 56 - 158 











Congress to maintain its national dominance at the Centre In New Delhi whilst 
I · . I . hid' h 79~80 eaVIng regIOna Issues to t e party ea ers In t at area. 
In return. state Congressmen depended on a unified leadership at the top. the so-called 
"High Command". or We. that not only distributed patronage and favours, but also 
arbitrated between internal disputes as they arose, intervening to maintain party unity 
when parochial politics became too divisive. Weiner describes this equilibrium of 
power in the Congress apparatus not as a means of suppressing conflict. but rather as 
a method of accommodation and adaptability: the key to the success of Congress over 
While the existence of a state and national leadership committed to a unified 
party organisation is a crucial factor. the essential reason that the Congress 
party is cohesive ... is not because there is little conflict within it but because 
there are legitimised and institutionalised roles and procedures for the 
handling of conflict.82 
This acceptance of conflict allowed for the upward mobility of Congress members, 
enabling lower ranking members to "challenge" rivals for the leadership of a district 
or state as well as contest for positions in the tier above. including those of the high 
command itself.83 In this way competition allowed for the promotion of winners and 
the exit of losers. but kept these competitive tendencies contained by not allowing 
factions to obliterate one another and jeopardise the party's dominance at whichever 
level.8.+ In this way. Congress was able to maintain its consensual authority and 
neutralise cleavages. It succeeded in doing so without stifling the emergence of fresh 
70 Weiner. M.: "Party Building in a New Nation". pA79 
80 Pye. Lucian: "Why One-Party Dominant Systems Decline" in Varshne;. A. (ed.) India and the 
Politics of Developing Countries: Essays in memOl:v of.livron Weiner. (1004). p. 55 
8[ Weiner. "Party Building in a New Nation" pA80 
8' . - IbId. pA 79 












ideas and groups into the system. nor placing a lid on the competitive instinct of its 
8" members. ~ 
3.3. Organisational vs. Governmental Wings 
In addition to the vertical ditTusion of power that existed between the nationaL state 
and district levels was the horizontal separation between those Congressmen who only 
served in the party organisation and those who were both party members and elected 
officials of state.86 However, this was a permeable divide. and as the party evolved 
these two 'wings' exchanged members as new factions gained ascendancy and fresh 
representatives were elected. One of the positive consequences of this tendency was 
for the organisational wing to act as a check on the bearers of state otlice. In this way. 
sections of the party served to articulate an oppositional voice in the political 
discourse: 
Indeed the organisational wing of the party does act in a manner traditionally 
associated with opposition parties: its legislative members make use of the 
question-hour to criticise the government: it publicises its dissatisfaction with 
government in the press; it attempts to win a majority for itself in the 
legislature: and it canvasses extensively during the elections to the AICC. the 
Pradesh Election Committees, and the Working Committee.87 
In the first party system one of the key divisions of power at the state level was a 
provision in the Congress constitution that forbade the same individual to hold the 
positions of chief minister (executive head of the state) and Pradesh Congress 
Committee president (provincial organisation leader) at the same time.88 This 
8' Gra\ es. D.: "Political Mobilization in India: The First Party System" Asiun Slirvel'. Vol. 16. No.9. 
(Sep .. 1976). p. 867 
gO Morris-lones. pp. 110-11 
87 Franda. Marcus: "The Organisational Development of India's Congress Party" Pacific Affairs. Vol. 
35. No.3. (Autumn. 1962). p. 251 











prevented the ministry from controlling the party machinery in the state. creating two 
centres of influence. with each wing regulating the other and limiting the 
concentration of executive power. Further strength was added to the party 
organisation. as the president of the PCC or DCC would be in charge of the collection 
of campaign funds for elections and general party finances. thus increasing the 
dependency of the members in the ministries on the state party.89 
Pandit Nehru on the other hand, resisted this tendency and always took care to 
maintain the separation between party and government. He insisted that the 
parliament. or Lok Sabha. was the primary source of decision-making power in the 
country. and not the party.90 "The party might lay down general policy. but it was up 
to the legislative wing to decide on the timing, the priorities, and the pace in carrying 
out those policies,'·91 Nehru argued that making the Prime Minister accountable to the 
party organisation would "reduce the democracy to a mockery,'·92 To emphasise the 
need for separation, he resigned from the Congress presidency after assuming the 
position of Prime Minister, whilst gradually increasing the power of the PM and his 
cabinet in the execution of major decisions. Later. however. Nehru was to again 
occupy the position of party president from 1951-54. in an effort to check the 
assertiveness of the party organisation after his acrimonious confrontations with 
former Congress presidents, Acharya Kripalani and Purushottamdas Tandon.93 These 
predecessors sought a robust role for the Working Committee. involving its members 
in policy questions such as economic planning and foreign affairs in a type of shadow 
S0 Ibid. 
00 Morris-lanes. p.128 
91 Kochanek. S.A.: "The Indian National Congress: The Distribution of Power Bet,\een Party and 
Government"' The JOllrna/ of Asian Studies. Vo1.25. No.-1-. (Aug .. 1966). p. 695 
g: Ibid .. p. 682 










cabinet.9-l Nehru deeply resented what he perceived as the overstepping of the party 
organisation's mandate. Therefore. by occupying the dual positions of PM and party 
president he was able to quell the rising assertiveness of the organisation by putting 
more power in the hands of cabinet and relegating the WC to internal party affairs 
9' only. -
Although the party organisation was mostly subordinated to the authority of the 
ministries. it made an essential contribution to the consensus-seeking function of the 
system. The "regulatory thermostat"" that was discussed earlier (regarding the 
opposition parties' ability to pressurise factions within the Congress) also applied to 
the dynamic between the organisation and government wings of the dominant party.96 
The different elements across the party/ministerial divide were enabled to express 
contrary views and compete for control. In this way the party organisation served as a 
vital conduit linking the government with society. responding to emerging pressures 
from below. and adopting specific causes as their own in order to challenge the 
government. This gave the party apparatus an important intermediary role - and some 
clout. Ultimately however, Kothari argues that the division of power was not evenly 
distributed between the two wings: 
The role of the organisational wing of the Congress is. no doubt. vital both for 
establishing lines of communication and mediation between government and 
society and for the politicisation of social differentiations and cleavages. But it 
has to be always borne in mind that the struggle for power wdhin the 
Congress is for entree [sic] into the seats of government and only at points of 
. . h h d 97 major crises. t e ot er way aroun . 
9.j Palmer. "The Indian Political System" p.2l5 
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The centre of power was usually in the hands of the bearer of office. but occasionally, 
as Kothari alludes to above, there reached a point of crisis or stalemate between party 
and ministry whereby the usual integrative function of the Congress system broke 
down.98 When such an impasse become prohibitive to the regular functioning of 
government. the direct intervention of the High Command in the dispute would 
usually tip the balance of power towards the party organisation. which "[acquired] 
ascendancy and [assumed] the task of re-establishing the cohesion of the system and 
its consensus:·99 However, this was always a temporary phase. Once the functional 
co-habitation of the system returned. the locus of power would invariably shift back 
towards the governmental wing. This was repeated both at national and state levels. 
and formed part of the ·thermostatic· mechanism of the Congress System. 
A better understanding of party/ministerial division can be gained by looking at the 
historical origins of the Congress as an organisation whose collective raison (tetre 
was the defeat of the colonial government. This gave the movement a shared objective 
and instilled it with a natural suspicion of ministerial power. Even though Congress 
participated in government institutions before Independence. this participation was of 
a nominal kind. and incumbents were always subservient to the detenninations of the 
party on issues of policy and their dealings with the British Raj. However. after self-
government was won the agitational and activist traditions of the Congress began to 
recede and the internal conflicts and contradictions of being in power grew. This 
steadily reduced the ability of the party organisation to detennine how the executive 













This shift also revealed the contradictory tendencies of the party membership. As 
Morris-Jones puts it. by the time of the death of Nehru in 1964 the internal argument 
of the Congress had changed. It had gone from a "band of self-sacrificing devotees of 
a cause" to a "collection for convenience, an aggregate for advantage:· ioo No longer 
did its members differ in terms of ideology or political principle. but rather on 
personal rivalries and factional spats. Members were united only by their mutual 
desire to acquire power. and the Congress party provided the perfect platform to 
realise these ambitions. 
3.4. Towards an Understanding of Congress Decline 
The extraordinary thing about the Congress experience is that primarily due to the 
constituency nature of the electoral system the Congress was able to convert slim 
electoral majorities into large majorities of seats in the legislature. Mendelsohn (1978) 
reminds us that in the three parliamentary elections of 1952. 1957. and 1962, 
Congress was unable to get more than 50% of the vote. receiving only 45-48% of the 
total. It shows that it is entirely possible for a candidate in a district to receive a 
minority of the total vote. but with a plurality of votes ensuring his victory. iOi The 
first 'fallout' elections of 1967 show a more marked reduction to 41 % of the total -
hardly grounds to claim an overwhelming consensus.iO~ 
100 Morris-lones "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance" pp. I 10-11 
101 A prime example of this tendency was in the 1951 - 52 elections. Here the Congress won 45% of 
the votes but gained 364 seats in the Lok Sabha. This number constituted 74% of the total seats. 
Compare this to the 10.5% of the votes gained by the socialist parties. whose tally translated into a 
meager 12 parliamentary seats: only 2.5% of the total seats. 
Park. "India's Political System". p.63 
10: Mendelsohn. Oliver: "The Collapse of the Indian National Congress" Pacific Affairs. Vol. 51. No.1. 











Here the latency factor of Kothari's has some credence \vhen noting that Congress 
enjoyed a relatively fragile hold on power when one considers the narrow electoral 
outcomes. The fragmentation of the opposition was key to Congress success. 103 
However. if the opposition were to consolidate this could pose a credible threat to 
Congress dominance, as collectively the opposition received more votes. Congress 
was able to withstand these threats and exploit its systemic advantage to ensure 
dominance over the long term. But how did it manage the competing tendencies 
within its broad and heterogeneous organisation over such a long period? 
The answer is it didn't. The chapters that follow reveal how the processes described 
above - of interest aggregation, equilibria of povver, and consensus-making 
mechanisms -were not inherent to the system, but an adaptive function of necessity. 
Their presence was borne out of the pragmatism needed to manage a party consisting 
of deeply disparate interests operating within a diverse social base. As we move into 
the decade in question, we find that these processes are over-ridden by the Prime 
Minister's secretariat for the expediency of short-term control. When this was done, 
the system that kept Congress in power in the various states was gradually lost as it 
isolated local leaders and destroyed the dependency of the national government on the 
states. As will be shown, this contributed irreversibly to Congress' decline. 











4. THE 1967 ELECTIONS & THE 
Loss OF THE FIRST STATES 
4.1. A Watershed Year 
4.2. Consensus Leadership & the Role of ·The Syndicate' 
4.3. The Rise ofIndira Gandhi 
4.4. Changing Regional Politics in India 
4.5. Assessing the Aftermath 
4.1. A Watershed Year 
1967 was an important year in Indian politics for several reasons. Here was a national-
and state-level election in which Congress dominance began to be seriously 
challenged. For the first time in post-Independence history the party lost power at the 
provincial level with defeats in at least half the states. This ended the aura of 
unassailability that the Congress had acquired thus far and marked the beginning of 
the assertion of state sovereignty against the monopoly of control by the Centre. In 
parliament the Congress majority was reduced to 25 seats with the loss of nearly 60 
seats (ultimately winning only 297 of the 545-seat Lok Sabha).lo4 Despite holding the 
Centre, these results represented a resounding humiliation for the Congress 
government. This chapter will explore why these states were lost the topography of 
the political landscape at the time, and the impact that these losses had on the 
development of the Congress henceforth. Whether this period signals a sharp turn in 
the fortunes of the organisation or merely a bump in a long road of dominance will be 
investigated. 
IO~ Corbridge. S & Harris. J.: ··Reinventing India - Liberalization. Hindu Nationalism and Popular 











The Fourth General Elections of the Republic of India took place between 15th and 
21 st February 1967. The elections were noteworthy in that they were the first 
contested by Indira Gandhi who had assumed the position of Congress President after 
the succession process that followed the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966. The 
ascension of Mrs. Gandhi to the leadership of the Congress was due in large part to 
the influence of a factional grouping within the High Command known as 'The 
Syndicate'. Consisting of several non-Hindi-speaking state leaders. the Syndicate had 
come to control the political process at the highest level by ruling through consensus, 
filling the vacuum left after the death of lawaharlal Nehru lo5 (The role of the 
Syndicate and Mrs. Gandhi's rise to power will be discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 
respectively). 
The most significant occurrence of 1967 - an ann liS horribilis for Congress - was the 
strong issue-orientation of the elections. The national mood in the mid-1960s was 
negatively affected by a combination of failings. most of which were economic. Food 
shortages. rising prices. huge disparities of wealth and the devaluation of the rupee all 
contributed to widespread discontent with the way the country was being run. I06 1966 
in particular was understood to be "the worst since Independence" with widespread 
public agitations. bandhs and strikes occurring throughout the country.I07 These 
grievances were directed against the ruling party and a critical evaluation of the 
government's performance by voters resulted in losses in several key states. lOS The 
Ill' Hanson. & Douglas. p.76 
106 Frankel. Francine. R.: "Crisis of Political Stability" in Indiu's Politicul Econolllv 19-/- 7 - :;OO-/-: The 
Grudual Revolution 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. '(2005). p.341 . 
107 Palmer. N.D.: "India's Fourth General Election" Asian Sun'e,v. Vol. 7. No.5. (Ma;.. 1967). p. 277 
108 Sheth. D.L.: "The Crisis of Political Authority" in Vom. R & Palshikar. S. (eds): Indiul1 Democracy. 











widespread hardship had contributed to a psychological malaise among the electorate 
I ·· t' h C 109 a termg votmg patterns away rom t e ongress. 
The election saw the highest ever turnout of voters with 61 % of the electorate casting 
their ballots. Compared with the previous general elections of 45% in 1951. 46.6% in 
1957 and 55.4% in 1962. this was a dramatic increase. llo Another change was the 
entry of millions of new ballots into the boxes. with 35 million more voters 
participating than the previous election in 1962.111 The post-Independence population 
explosion meant a higher proportion of younger voters took part in the polls. Half of 
the electorate of 250 million were under the age of 35 and this demographic 
fluctuation surely impacted on the outcome of the election.ll~ The new generation was 
not as steeped in the Congress liberation mythology: having only known it as a party 
of governance. They were thus hungry for change. 
In eight states in the Union, change is what they got. Voters ousted Congress 
governments in Bihar, the Punjab. Uttar Pradesh (UP). Bengal. Orissa. Rajasthan, 
Madras and Kera1a. Madras was an especially sobering result for the once almighty 
Congress. being completely outrun by the Tamil nationalist Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam 113 (DMK) and its allies. Congress received a paltry 49 seats in a state 
assembly of234. with their rivals claiming 138. Kerala ushered in the Communist-led 
United Front. with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) winning the most seats. 
10e) Palmer. "The Indian Political System". p. 260 
110 Ibid. 
III Wallace. Paul: "India: The Dispersion of Political Pmwr" AsiU/1 Survey. Vol. 8. No.2. A Survey of 
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Congress received only 9 out of 133 seats in this state, A similar left-leaning United 
Front was also victorious in Bengal. 
These results predate many of the developments that would later emerge to challenge 
Congress's claim to be the sole party of governance at the all-India level. As Kothari 
explains. the losses revealed the institutional vacuum that existed after the departure 
of Nehru, and the growing inability of Congress to balance the competing forces 
\vithin its organisation: 
The election itself provided the conditions for the fission of the party and the 
frustration of the consensus-maintaining mechanisms which had served the 
party so well and for so long. The ultimate arbiter. an overpowering Prime 
Minister. in the image of a Nehru, had not been replaced nor had an 
institutional mechanism been developed to serve this vital function. The 
customary mechanisms and attitudes for achieving consensus on critical intra-
party issues had been eroded in the succession fights after the death of La 1 
Bahadur Shastri. There was an acceptance of open conflict. State level 
conflicts became germane to national political cont1icts with the expansion of 
the power of state level leaders in the succession and policy crises after the 
death of Nehru. The actuality of defeat in 1967 established a national 
precedent. Opposition parties can win and non-Congress governments can 
rule.ll-l 
4.2. Collective Leadership & the Role of 'The Syndicate' 
Before assessing the implications of the 1967 election it is necessary to examine the 
political context of the preceding years. Following the death of Nehru in 1964, the 
Congress Party was tasked with the problem of succession. Nehru's dual position as 
party leader and head of state enabled him to keep a lid on the contestations between 
the Congress organisational and ministerial wings. His towering personality ensured 
he could step in to alleviate intra-party spats where and when they arose. However, 











Nehru was also capable of deferring to chief ministers and mostly left the 
administration of the variOUS states to his subordinates in government. During his 
time. Congress was headed by a strong High Command that was able to distribute 
leaders and resources through the party branches as well as actively participate in 
formulating policy.115 But by 1967 this mediatory role had deteriorated. a tact 
reflected in the poor showing in many of the states. In this instance, factionalism had 
compromised the Congress rather than added to the vigour of its internal debate. in the 
tradition of 01d. 116 
Despite the historical nation-building legacy of Congress since Independence, the last 
three years of Nehru's tenure were characterized by some crucial failures in national 
leadership. A particular disappointment occurred in the area of foreign affairs. The 
gains of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were squandered when the Chinese 
invaded the northern Himalayan territories in a smaiL but bloody border dispute in 
1962. 117 The military defeat meted out by a supposedly non-aggressive neighbour was 
an embarrassment for the government and a personal blow for the Prime Minister. In 
addition. the fourth Five Year Plan had stalled. and the Planning Commission 
responsible for its implementation had become moribund." s The high public 
expenditure of the plans created a spiralling financial crisis. inducing the Bretton 
Woods institutions to force a devaluation of the rupee. much to India's chagrin. 
Chronic food shortages necessitated foreign food aid from the United States and a 
revision in agricultural policy. This prompted the commercialisation programme 
II' Jacob. p.13 
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known as the 'Green Revolution .119. which was at odds with the quasi-Socialist state-
driven development model of which Nehru was so intimately a part. 120 Nehru's 
passing in many ways represented the end of many of his ideals - non-alignment. '3 rd 
Way' centrally controlled industrial expansion. and a unifying secular ideology. 
It was in this context that a grouping colloquially known as the 'Syndicate' would 
emerge as the principal players in Indian political life. A gerontocratic cabal of Chief 
Ministers, most of whom originated from the Southern states. the Syndicate's power 
resided in the organisational structures of the party. Contemporaries of Nehru and 
Gandhi. the body was headed by Kamaraj from Madras. Atulya Ghosh from West 
Bengal. Nijalingappa of Karnataka, Sanjiva Reddy from Andhra and S.K. Patil who 
hailed from Bombay state. 121 For many years the Syndicate would playa major role as 
kingmakers, ruling through collective decree and choosing leaders who were pliable 
to their will. 122 
The Syndicate met shortly after the death of Pandit Nehru to decide on the question of 
succession. One of the principal challengers in the Congress organisation was Morarj i 
Desai. a veteran of the movement. A social conservative and a stalwart of the struggle, 
Desai was a strong contender for the post. However, the Syndicate stymied his 
candidacy as he was deemed to be too '"rigid, doctrinaire and right-wing:· 123 
119 Singh. M.P.: "The Crisis of the Indian State: From Quiet Developmentalism to Noisy Democracy"' 
.-isian SlIrvev. Vol. 30. No.8. (Aug .. 1990). p. 813. 
1:0 According to Blair: "The 'decade of development' of the 1960s saw the Green Revolution increase 
"heat production in India by two-and-a-half times. and total food production went up by a factor of 25 
percent. but this growth had little effect on weltare. for little of it went into the hands of the poor."' 
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The person upon whom the Syndicate' s trust would eventually fall was the demure 
Lal Bahadur Shastri. Shastri had neither a strong base of support. nor any high level of 
opposition against him. but he was successful in serving the need for continuity that 
the Syndicate required. His style in dealing with inter- and intra-party conflicts did not 
differ radically to Nehru's; nor did his economic outlook. which was similarly Social 
Democratic. But Shastri did not have his predecessor" s natural charisma. and had to 
rely more heavily on the Congress High Command and the Grand Council of party 
bosses for major decisions. 124 Apart from easing the transition from Nehru, Shastri's 
coup de grace was the resolution of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. However, his 
incumbency was notable for its brevity and he was no more than the steward of an 
uncertain interregnum. 125 He died suddenly in January 1966. the night after brokering 
a ceasefire with the Pakistanis in Tashkent. 126 
4.3. The Rise of Indira Gandhi 
With the passing of Shastri, the Syndicate was forced to cast about for a new leader, 
one who would be compliant to its directives. plus some have some degree of 
charismatic authority. With Desai once again staking his claim. Indira Gandhi (then 
the Minister of Information and Broadcasting) eventually secured the nomination as 
leader of the Congress Party in Parliament. This was done at the behest of the 
Syndicate. who in the absence of a suitable mediator-arbitrator. settled for Mrs. 
I:~ Dua. Bhag\\ an D.: "Presidential Rule in India: i\ Stud) in Crisis Politics" .Jsian Survey. Vol. 19. 
No.6. (Jun .. 1979). p. 621 
I:' Brass. Paul: The .Yew Camhridge Historv of India - /1'.1 - The Politics a/India Since Independence. 
2nd ed. Cambridge l'niversity Press (1990). p.38 











Gandhi in what was widely seen as a provisional arrangement. I : 7 A key advantage 
that Mrs. Gandhi had for the Congress was her proximity to her father. lawaharlal 
Nehru. his legacy in death unmatched by the reality of his tenure in office.l~s The 
allure of his daughter as the inheritor of a ruling familial dynasty was a strong 
motivation for her promotion to head of state. At that stage. Indira Gandhi was 
popular with the electorate and seen to have support throughout the party. but without 
an identifiable base of power to call her own .. Indira'. as she was affectionately 
1"9 known. was a useful figurehead to ensure the party elders could lead by proxy. -
The ascension of Indira Gandhi would, in time. have far greater significance than the 
old party men would realise. As the years unfolded. Mrs. Gandhi's ideological 
coherence became more pronounced, and the ability of the Syndicate to exert its will 
over the Prime Minister shrank and attenuated over time. The struggle between Indira 
and her makers was indicative of a larger tension within the party: 
The events leading to the "second succession" as described above signify no 
more than the beginning of certain major shifts in the institutional balance of 
the political system in India. The conflict for power within the Congress and 
the increasing influence of one level of party struggle on another symbolize 
more than a mere struggle between personalities: they raise basic issues 
regarding institutional relationships between party organisation. government, 
P I· d d' 130 ar lament an state governments an party umts. 
Assuming the premiership in 1966. the elections early the following year were a 
premature test for the 49-year-old Mrs. Gandhi. The poor showing of the Congress at 
1:~ Lele. J. "Understanding Indian Politics: Are We Asking the Right QuestionsT' in Vora. R. & 
Pulshikar. S. (cds.) Indian Democracy. Sage Publications (2004). p.181 
1:~ Although Indira bore the name of 'Gandhi' she had no relation to the JIv[ahatma Gandhi. Her 
marriage to Congressman Feroze Gandhi (also unrelated) is the origin of the name. 
I~l) Bjorkman. l.W: India.· Party Personality and pvnasty Basil Blacb\ell Publishing (1987). p.60 
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the polls led many to dismiss her as a bit player. This. as it turned out. was a 
disingenuous perception. More on this in Chapter 5. 
4.4. Changing Regional Dynamics in India 
One of the most noteworthy outcomes of the 1967 general elections (in addition to the 
strong issue orientation) was the regional bent of the voting. The awakening of new 
provincial movements - and the chaotic governments they formed - had a considerable 
impact on the Indian party system. 
Madsen (1967) tells us that the strength of regional loyalties often trumped national 
patriotism. Observing a user survey from 1967, he notes that 
fully two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the proffered statement that 
one should be loyal to one's own region first and then to India! Moreover, 
even a most cursory examination of the many and varied fOnTIS of what is 
being called here "the opposition" to Congress will reveal the very great 
importance of region in their support base. 13 ! 
The heterogeneous nature of Indian society meant that many social cleavages existed 
in the different regions. These divisions often combined. and included strains between 
socialism and conservatism, secularism and communalism. tradition and modernity 
and national versus regional allegiances. 13c This period also experienced an increase of 
the so-called "anti-system" movements, such as the Maoist insurgents in the outlying 
eastern territories. (The 'Naxalite' movement is so named after the violent seizure of 
land by a peasant uprising in Naxalbari in 1967. The narrow strip along the West 
I, I Madsen. D.: "Solid Congress Support in 1967: A Statistical Inquiry" ( 1970) p.l 009 











Bengal and East Pakistan 133 border is to this day a source of intense violent struggle 
between the guerrillas and the government). 134+135 
Communalism became an increasingly prominent force during these elections. For 
example, the Jan Sangh, a Hindu chauvinist organisation, aggressively advocated a 
ban on cattle slaughter. Many protests and public acts of violence surrounded the 
promotion of this cause, including an attack by a marauding band of naked sadhus -
bearing tridents and spears - who laid siege to Parliament House. 136 Bombay state 
(now Maharashtra) witnessed the assertion of local identity politics along linguistic 
and ethnic grounds, with the Shiv Sena (meaning "Shivaji's Army") basing its 
political programme on hostility to migrants, particularly South Indians, as well as 
non-Marathi speakers and Muslims. 13 7+138 This xenophobic 'othering' was in direct 
contrast to the official secularism espoused by the Congress and its tolerance of all 
creeds. 
Linguistic associations took on a deeper significance during this time. In Madras 
(renamed Tamil Nadu in 1967) the DMK was particularly good at fostering anti-
Congress sentiment through their resistance to Central interference on state language 
policies. The implementation of Hindi as a national language was a particularly 
despised proposal. as it would have displaced English as the lingua franca of the 
139 country. Had such a law been implemented it would have prevented non-Hind i-
13, Following the 1971 \\ar of secession with West Pakistan the area formerl) known as East Pakistan 
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speaking Dravidians from taking national government jobs. among other restrictions. 
By resisting such measures. the DMK played to the fears and ambitions of a national 
minority ambivalent about its role in the broader Indian society. In this way. these 
parties "[combined] promises of protection for economic interests with promotion of 
the socio-cultural aspiration of threatened groupS:·I-IO By fusing populist techniques 
with parochial demands, regional parties such as the DMK were able to successfully 
challenge Congress for control of state ministries.I-I 1 
An entirely new phenomenon was the proliferation of defections that plagued the 
Congress party's rank and file. One of the methods to facilitate conciliation and 
accommodation within the 'Congress System' was the promotion of a strong Centre 
with equally strong governments in the states. However. the fallout of 1967 was that 
national and regional Congress structures became ever more bifurcated.I-I~ In the years 
following the elections, between March 1967 and March 1970. there were 1827 
defections out of 3487 seats. 143 This number of members crossing the floor was 
unprecedented. To make matters worse. there were comparatively fewer defections 
from opposition parties towards Congress.I-I-I The fickle tide of 'switchers' reflected 
an inability of the Congress organisation to keep its members in check. I-I5 This was 
not only due to ill discipline. but revealed the failure of the party to allow for the 
natural expression of dissent and the resolution of conflict between members of 
duelling factions. As a result, competition for legislative seats meant that opponents 
[.)0 Ibid. 
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[.)2 Corbridge. & Harris. p.7 I 
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within Congress would sabotage the efforts of their rivals to win incumbency - to the 
overall detriment of the party. 146 
However. these were Phyrric victories for the opposition. The governments formed in 
the opposition-run states were in most cases a patchwork coalition of divergent 
interests. The coming-and-going of defectors would tear coalitions apart as quickly as 
they had been formed and there was a high degree of volatility at the state level. In 
order to defeat Congress, once principled opposition leaders sank to new lows for the 
chance to gain legislative seats. Lele (2004) explains some of the new problems: 
One common theme ... was that of an imminent or desirable polarization of 
politics. away from the so-called Nehruvian consensus. However. it seemed 
clear that. although the traditional mechanisms of competition management 
within the Congress had been weakened after the deaths of Nehru and Shastri 
and were further fractured by the results of the 1967 elections, heterogeneous 
coalitions of smaller opposition parties. including the new and temporary 
creations of the Congress dissidents, did not have the capacity to successfully 
contain elite competition and to restore stability.147 
Instability in the state ministries resulted in a special order known as President's Rule 
being enacted in five states. President's Rule \vas a constitutional provision only 
instituted during periods of severe crisis, such as mass civil disorder or the breakdown 
of state government. It involved the suspension of the state assemblies and the 
removal of the chief minister. Sovereignty would cease to be local and shift to the 
national government. with a governor employed to oversee the administration of the 
state until such time as order was restored. 148 In this instance. the rapid turnover rate 
of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA 's) from one party to another 
necessitated intervention by the Centre. The states in which this took effect were 
l~b Lele. p.181 
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Haryana, West BengaL Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Bihar. I -+9 Haryana was the most 
acute example of such instability and defections. As such, the mass switching between 
parties by legislators and the unravelling of state governments was popularly termed 
"Doing a Haryana".150 In this case the intervention was clearly justified with 
prolonged periods of interregnum crippling India's newest state. However. this also 
reflected the growing tendency of New Delhi to override domestic governments and 
the discordant relationship between India's federal structures and its unitary 
compulsions. 
4.5. Assessing the Aftermath 
For Congress, the results of the election were disappointing. Although the total vote 
for the party went down by only 4%, it had a marked affect on its overall seat tally. 
representing over 21 % drop in number of seats and a significant reduction of its 
national majority.151 Syndicate members sustained heavy personal loses in the key 
constituencies of their home provinces. S.K. PatiL the Railways Minister and Chief 
Minister of Bombay. went down. So too did Atulya Ghosh, who lost in Bengal. The 
most surprising rejection however. was that of Kamaraj, who was voted out in 
Madras. 152 The popular disaffection with Congress at this point was palpable; due in 
large part to the injection of young voters into the electorate. 
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Overall. three key developments came out of the election process. The first was a new 
perception by the opposition parties that Congress dominance could be undone. The 
so-called "cracks in the monolith" were beginning to show. The second was the 
notable issue-orientation that Indian politics had taken. as opposed to the uncritical 
affirmations of the dominant order that characterized the previous polls. The third was 
the prelude to the disintegration crisis that would grip the Congress. culminating in 
the split in 1969. This took the form of a decrease in party loyalty and the inability of 
the mediatory mechanisms within Congress to ameliorate conflict between members 
of competing factions. IS3 It is this fragmentary tendency that is the focus of Chapter 5. 











5. THE DOMINANT PARTY SPLITS: 
THE CRISIS OF 1969 
5.1. Polarising Tendencies 
5.2. Things Fall Apart in Bangalore 
5.3. An Ideological Split? 
5.4. The Congress (R) in Power 
5.1. Polarising Tendencies 
November 1969 saw a four-month period of intense intra-party contlict culminating in 
a split in the Congress party. the first of its kind since Independence.15~ By this stage 
Congress was in a condition of institutional breakdovvn with the split mirroring the 
factions that has emerged after the ascendancy of Indira Gandhi. This section will 
seek to explain what precipitated the crisis. the composition of the factions that 
developed thereafter. as well as the ideological poles around which different 
Congressmen were able to cohere. 
As discussed in previous chapters. the longevity of the Congress prior to 1969 was 
based on its ability to assimilate divergent interests and to foster a culture of 
consensus. It did so by drawing on a wide range of ideologies. and accommodating 
various ethnic. linguistic and regional groups in its ranks. lss This consensus model 
was now officially broken with the Congress splitting along ideology and factional 
loyalties into two groups: the Indira-led Congress (R) and the breakaway Congress 
(0). These groups roughly corresponded with the ministerial/organisational divide. 
l'~ Hardgrave. R.: ··The Congress in India - Crisis and SpliC .~siull Surrey. Vol. 10. No.3. (:'vIar..1970). 
p.256 
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although not entirely SO.156 The eventual success of the Congress (R) faction and its 
ability to govern will be assessed in the final section. 
5.2. Things Fall Apart in Banga/ore 
Immediately after the losses of the 1967 elections. the tensions betvveen Indira Gandhi 
and the Syndicate intensified. 157 The organisational wing of the party emerged from 
the election severely weakened. with many of the Syndicate members voted out of 
their constituencies. Kamaraj himself was particularly damaged after the Congress 
defeat in Tamil Nadu. 158 As the Congress president and arbiter between the two wings 
of the party. the loss of his seat in the Lok Sabha reduced his capacity to mediate in 
the rifts that would later emerge. 
After 1967. Mrs. Gandhi began to assert her independence from the Syndicate through 
subtle acts of defiance. This was exemplified after the election when she unilaterally 
drew up her cabinet without consulting Kamaraj .159 Rejecting the provisional 
arrangement the Syndicate had set out for her, she again asserted her autonomy when 
she nominated Zakir Hussain for President of the Republic. By doing so. Indira 
openly defied the wishes of Kamaraj and the party organisation for its own candidate, 
and as early as August 1968 it became known that the Syndicate wished to see her 
removed. 160 The presidential nomination would reappear later as a divisive issue in 
the party following the death of Hussain in office and would come to dominate the 
[''1 Hardgr'l\e. p.256 
[,- Frankel. Francine. R.: "The Congress Split and the Radicalization of Indian Politics" in India's 
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All-India Congress Committee meeting in Bangalore in July 1969. The conference 
was a seminal event in the history of the party and the beginning of the unravelling 
process. 161 
Prior to the conference. there were already fragmentary tendencies developing within 
the party. With parliamentary elections scheduled for 1972. Indira Gandhi sought to 
increase the power of the Prime Minister's office against the Syndicate. whose base of 
support lay in the party organisation structures. 162 One of Mrs. Gandhi's strategies was 
to play to the perception of the Syndicate as rightward leaning and position herself as 
ideologically more progressive. Indira was indeed closer to certain socialist-minded 
groups. and prominent leftist Congressmen such as her political advisor P.N. Haksar 
had much influence on her thinking. But her main strategy was to align herself with 
the so-called 'Young Turks', an emerging group within the Congress organisation 
\vho sought to revitalize moribund collectives such as the Congress Forum for 
Socialist Action in order to sway policy making initiatives towards socialism. 163 To do 
this they sought to challenge the "vested interests" that persisted within the governing 
old guard of the party whose dependency on landed elites and big business they saw 
as hampering India's economic emancipation. 16-l Indira's courting of these groups 
earlier in the year was an effort to bolster support against the imminent threat of 
expulsion posed by the Syndicate. 
Most indicative of the leftward shift in Indian politics was the declaration of the Ten 
Point Plan at the Working Committee meeting held shortly after the elections in May 
[b[ Hardgnl\e. p.257 
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1967. 165 A programme of action for the Congress government. the most important of 
the points was the provision for government control of banking institutions and 
insurance. the curbing of monopolies. and state control of food grain exports. 1M 
Among other rural works and collectivisation programmes were the expansion of the 
public distribution of food grains and the abolition of the "Privy Purses". The purses 
were financial privileges afforded to the rulers of the Princely States. a legacy of the 
colonial era in Rajasthan. Karnataka and other states. who were subsidized with state 
financial assistance as an incentive to join the Indian Union. Decades later. these 
handouts came under serious attack and were the first victims of the socialist turn 
within the party. 167 
The ideological bent of the divisions between the ministerial and organisational wings 
came to the fore in a public spat over government economic policy at the All-India 
Congress Committee meeting held in the southern city of Bangalore in 1969. The 
Prime Minister sent a note to the Working Committee outlining "some stray thoughts" 
- a euphemism for strong measures to be taken to increase state involvement in key 
sectors of the economy.168 These included nationalizing the banks. reforming 
legislation around access to land. as well as placing "ceilings on urban income and 
property. and curbs on industrial monopolies:· 169 One of the main issues was of the 
role of public enterprises, and a policy debate ensued between Indira and new party 
President and Syndicate front man Nijalingappa over the role of state driven industry 
with Indira arguing for "more and more" investment. 17o Nijalingappa in a strongly 
[(" Kochanek. "The Congress Par1y of I ndia: The Dynam ics of One- Part) Democracy". pp.41 7 - 419 
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\'vorded President's address came out for an increase in market-led growth and a 
streamlined public sector. 171 Despite their agreement on the fundamental aims of the 
Ten-Point Programme. the clash would precipitate a long-term antagonism between 
the hvo leaders. 
Members of the Syndicate were not ideologically as one. and the public enterprises 
issue \vas met with mixed responses from the group. For instance. conservative 
members such as S.K. Patil and Nijalingappa along with Morarji Desai opposed the 
measure.17~ However. there were also sympathetic elements such as Kamaraj himselt~ 
and Home Minister Y.B. Chavan. Chavan would push for the nationalization 
programme as a means to broker peace bet\veen the warring factions. and the 
concession was made to Indira Gandhi on the eve of the presidential 
. . 173+17-+ 
nommatIOn. 
The contestations within the party came to a head with the need to fill the vacancy of 
the President of India after the death of Hussain early in the year. Although not 
holding an executive position. the president serves as the constitutional head of 
government and has the power to act as a check on the PM. A complicit candidate 
therefore would have enhanced Indira's resistance against the attacks of Kamaraj and 
Desai. 175 The Syndicate put forward Sanjiva Reddy. the speaker of the Lok Sabha, as 
I-I Ibid. 
1-: Desai. the old contender. had been included in the cabinet \\ith the dual portfolio of Deputy Prime 
IVlinister and Finance Minister in an effort to broker unity at the Centre. HO\yeyer. it was widely 
interpreted as a calculated move by the Syndicate to "keep an eye on Indira Gandhi" and to pre\ent her 
from consolidating her power against the party leadership. This. as Desai \\Tyl; noted. was an "irony of 
fate" gi\en that the Syndicate had promoted Indira in an effort to keep him out of PO\\er. 
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their nominee. The Prime Minister's preferred candidate was the Acting President. 
V.V.Giri.176 Initially Indira was forced to compromise by supporting the candidacy of 
Jagjivan Ram. the Minister for Food and Agriculture. but the lack of support for him 
by the Syndicate meant his candidacy quickly withered. However. a sudden 
development saw Giri drop out of his position as acting president to run as an 
independent. circumventing the need for the approval of the party bosses. Giri then 
embarked on an energetic campaign with the Socialist Forum as his backers. and 
made overtures to both Communist parties and the United Fronts in Kerala and W. 
Bengal. The DMK in Tamil Nadu and the Muslim League also supported his 
• • 177 
nomInation. 
In response. a whip was issued for the Congress Party in Parliament (CPP) to vote for 
Reddy in the election. The whip was publicly defied by parliamentarians of the Indira 
faction. whose support lay with Giri. Socialist Forum members became, in Frankers 
\yords. ··the storm troopers of the Giri nomination·· 178 and Giri won by the slightest of 
margins. 
The election of the new president was a triumph and was soon followed by the firing 
by Mrs. Gandhi of Morarji Desai from his position as Finance Minister (prompting 
him also to resign his other cabinet post as Deputy Prime Minister in protest).179 
Combined with the nationalization of fourteen banks and the success ofV.V. Giri. this 
was an enormously popular victory for Indira Gandhi. Desai was seen as a block to 
1'6 Hanlgrme. p.257 
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Mrs. Gandhi's socialist ambitions and his exit endeared her to the masses who saw her 
t' h 180 as an avatar 0 t e poor. 
A decisive break came with the resignation of C. Subramaniam as president of the 
Tamil Nadu Congress Committee. This was after being forced to step down after 
members of the PCC loyal to Kamaraj challenged Subramaniam's capacity to lead. 181 
The expulsion precipitated a counter attack by the AICC against President 
Nijalingappa. The body, most of whom supported Prime Minister Gandhi, accused 
him of bias in the leadership contest and launched a signature campaign against 
him.18~ In retaliation. Nijalingappa removed both Subramaniam and Fakhruddin Ali 
Ahmed from the Tamil Working Committee. On 1 November 1969 two separate 
Congress Working Committee meetings were held simultaneously in different parts of 
Neyv Delhi. \vith Indira hosting her supporters in the prime ministerial offices. IS3 The 
show of dissent warranted a furious response from Nijalingappa who accused Gandhi 
of trying to tear the Congress apart by organizing a different AICC. It was. according 
to him, "an unpardonable act of gross indiscipline. a tlagrant violation of the 
Constitution of the Congress calculated to disrupt the unity of the organisation".184 
The split was unfolding; the falcon could no longer hear the falconer. 
Indira wrote a six-page open letter detailing her position and revealing her 
impressions of how the Congress organisation had failed during the crisis. In it she 
stated that the schisms were "'not a mere clash of personalities", a "tight for power", 
or a "contlict between the Parliamentary and organisational wings" but rather 
180 Frank~1. "Th~ Congr~ss Split"". pA20 
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"between those who are for Socialism. for change and for the fullest internal 
democracy and debate in the organisation on the one hand. and those who are for the 
status quo. for conformism and for less than full discussion inside the Congress:,185 
As a punitive measure for hosting the rebel WC Indira Gandhi was tried in abstentia. 
expelled from the party and removed from her position as leader of the Congress 
Party in Parliament (CPP).186 However, the Syndicate did not manage to entice the 
majority of MPs to desert Indira (whose support lay in the ministerial wing) and 
effectively ejected themselves from the united Congress and out of power. When R.S. 
Singh filled the post of CPP leader, he became the Leader of the Opposition with the 
support of only 60 breakaway MPs under the new banner of the Indian National 
Congress (Organisation).187 The members of the party aligned with Indira went under 
the new title of Indian National Congress (Requisitioned), so named after the 
'requisitioning' of the new AICC,ISS which retained the bulk of the old membership (a 
total of 297 MPs. 220 of whom were from the Lok Sabha. the rest from the state 
assemblies).189 The Congress (R) subsequently elected new leaders and formed a 
hasty alliance with the Communists to retain the majority in the parliament. 
5.3. An Ideological Split? 
Indira Gandhi's claim that the conflict within the party was between those who were 
for socialism and change against those who were for the status quo needs to be 
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examined closely. Was the core character of the Congress defined by these cleavages? 
Was the split precipitated by the open contestation of ideology. or was it merely the 
petty grievances of factions competing for power and patronage? 
It is clear that the factional nature of the split was overlooked in an effort to apply an 
ideological prism to the conflict. Certain factors could lead an observer to believe that 
the split was indeed due to a left-right schism. The populist economic strategies 
employed by Mrs. Gandhi during the contest were contributing factors to this 
perception. Another was the closeness that the Congress (R) had to the Communist 
Party of India and the renaissance of the Congress Forum for Socialist Action. 190 In 
international relations. overtures were made towards the Soviet Union. initiated by the 
Forum. 191 
However, as Hampton Davey (1972) argues, the perceived Left-Right polarisation 
ignored the fact that the new Congress (R) had firmly established control over centrist 
politics. 192 Its progressive image belied a deep attachment to the wealthy peasantry 
and big business. the bedrock of the old networks that had guaranteed Congress 
support for so long. Despite the bond forged with the Communists. Congress (R) 
ultimately rejected the politics of class struggle. 193 This was evident the following 
year ( 1970) with the quashing of the ""Land Grab Movement"" that had seized parts of 
the countryside (a cause celebre of the CPI). as well as Congress' reluctance to 
implement the land ceilings legislation. 194 
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Although the old Congress was depicted as hostile to socio-economic reform. and 
vvere conservative in character and temperament. this did not ret1ect an ideological 
conservatism. The political philosophies of the Syndicate members were in fact 
incredibly heterogeneous with moderate Socialists like Kamaraj and dyed-in-the-wool 
conservatives such as S.K. Patil. The Syndicate. it seemed. was drawn together by a 
mutual dislike for Indira Gandhi.195 The ruling Congress was similarly diverse in its 
members' ideological persuasions. The plurality of views within both parties suggests 
that the eventual split was due more to personal power contestations within the 
broader organisation rather than coherently disputed ideological battles. 196 It is clear 
that the radicals in the party offered Indira a way to preserve her power against the 
threats of the Syndicate, and she played to these groups' expectations. 
It is apparent that the failure of the mediatory mechanism to deal with the clash led to 
the irretrievability of the split. Unfortunately. these failures were only compounded by 
the exit of the Congress (0). which took with it many skilled members and years of 
institutional memory. The departure of nearly 40% of the undivided party's 
organisational strength removed an important oversight function for the Requisitioned 
Congress. 197 In later years, as the central leadership became more dogmatic. the party 
organisation had been so deliberately underdeveloped that it was unable to assert 
itself. All forms of opposition now lay outside of the party. whereas in the past an 
agonistic culture had been inherent to the system .198 Given the heavy re liance of the 
Congress System on party organisation and its ability to mobilize support from below, 
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this would prove a fatal error for the Congress (R). The benefit for Indira of purging 
her enemies was far outweighed by the long-term cost of destroying the party 
apparatus. 
5.4. The Congress (R) in Power 
The victorious wing emerged from this maelstrom as a hostile force. tainted by the 
divisive politics of the previous two years. Primarily. this period saw an increase in 
the personalisation tactics of Indira Gandhi and the de-institutionalisation of decision-
making structures. Frank describes the effect this had on regional politics. the most 
important locale of Congress dominance: 
Indira also needed to extend her control to the states beyond New Delhi. Over 
the next few years, she tactically 'eased out" state leaders who had failed to 
support her against the Syndicate. including. in time. the Chief Ministers of 
Rajasthan. Andhra Pradesh. Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. She then 
replaced them with her own people by 'nominating' candidates for chief 
minister who were then ratified in office by the dominant Congress legislative 
party. She made sure the candidates were men personally loyal to her but who 
lacked their own power bases. 199 
In this context. personal loyalty was valued more highly than organisational loyalty in 
what Bjorkman (1987) labels the "rise of plebiscitary politics:·2oo 
The hangover of the split was that the idiom of politics had changed. the previous 
emphasis on conciliation and consensus giving way to a language of confrontation 
and conceit.201 Marxist polemics became the preferred method of dealing with 
opposition parties critical of the new governing strategy.202 
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As a result. even the appearance of political consensus that had established the 
Congress as a party of national unity was shattered. Political rhetoric 
emphasizing slogans of class struggle replaced the pragmatic language of 
accommodation. Compromise, once lauded as the expression of India's 
national genius in political life. was denounced as nothing more than collusion 
\vith the vested interests. Political action increasinglv tended toward 
confrontation.203 ~ • 
The increased access Congress (R) enjoyed to the press and its control over the All-
India Radio service would strengthen its ability to project a newly assertive 
ideological platform to the broader populace?l-l Following the split an atmosphere of 
sectarianism and a suspicion of consensus prevailed. Mrs. Gandhi herself set the 
exclusionary tone when she said: "Our doors will be shut to those who are working 
against our policies. our way of thinking and our ideology. We have to close our door 
to such forces:·205 Such was the prevailing mood in the new dominant party. 
emblematic of an attitudinal shift in governance that would only worsen as the new 
decade dawned. 
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6. SLOUCHING TO"VARDS DELHI: 
THE 1970s & THE EMERGENCY 
6.1. A Tumultuous Decade 
6.2. The 197 I Elections 
i. Indira Wave? 
6.3. Pressures From Within & Without 
t. Pressures from Within 
ii. Pressures ji-om Without 
6.4. The Emergency 
"India is Indira. Indira is India" 
- D.K. Barooah (Congress President/o6 
6.1. A Tumultuous Decade 
In Chapter 6 the slide towards authoritarianism that characterized the first half of the 
1970s will be discussed. This period is notable for two events: the elections of 1971, 
which saw a surge in popular support for the new Congress (R) under the leadership 
of Indira Gandhi. as well as the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1975. This 
chapter will critically evaluate the social and political conditions of the period. and 
examine the justifications that Mrs. Gandhi made in defence of her actions. The 
abuses of authority that were so widespread during the Emergency will be looked at. 
and some light will be shed on the effects that the suspension of civil liberties. press 
censorship. and the suppression of opposition parties had on the political culture of 
the period. 











6.2. The 1971 Elections 
[n the run-up to the elections. the Congress (R) government for the first time faced an 
alliance of opposition parties. all with different regional associations and bases of 
support. The so-called "Grand Alliance" was made up of the Congress (0). Jan 
Sangh. Swatantra. and the Samukta Socialist Party (SSP).207 The Congress (R) in 
return formed its own centre-left coalition. However. this was not to be. as many had 
hoped. the arrival of a genuine two-party system in Indian politics.208 The Grand 
Alliance was disparaged by leading Congressman Asoka Mehta. as "neither grand nor 
much of an alliance .. 209 as it lacked ideological unity and was unable to build 
sustainable national support. Rather. the alliance chose to appeal to their constituent 
parts and combine in a spirited attack on Indira Gandhi as opposed to provide 
meaningful policy alternatives. Indeed. the personality of Mrs. Gandhi was the most 
cogent factor during the election period. reflected in the campaign slogan of the 
opposition coalition: Indira Hatao (Remove Indira). 
The general election of 1971 was important for two reasons. Firstly. this was a mid 
term election that was held one year in advance of the original date. Furthermore. the 
elections were 'de-linked'. meaning that the voting for the national and state 
assemblies was no longer to be held together.210 This was clearly an attempt to 
"capitalise upon the national appeal of Indira Gandhi over her rivals in the Congress 
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organisation and in state politics generally:':'l' Since 1971. the standard practice has 
been to hold parliamentary and state legislative assembly elections separately. 
The second occurrence of 1971 worth noting was the outcome. The schism in the 
Congress in 1969 had appeared to signal the decline of the dominant hegemony the 
party wielded. However. driven by the populist charisma of Indira Gandhi, the new 
Congress (R) scored a significant majority, receiving 43.64% of the vote, enabling it 
to capture 68% of the seats in the Lok Sabha.2l2 For those who had predicted the 
demise of the Congress, this was a major surprise. Why did the Congress do so well in 
these elections, and what were the significant turning points for the electorate from 
four years earlier? 
i. Indira . Wave .? 
The victory of Congress (R) in 1971 IS often attributed to the "Indira Wave" 
phenomenon. The enormous popularity of the Prime Minister is seen as the sole 
source of Congress success - rather than the usual efforts of party structures 
throughout the country to deliver the traditional voting blocs.2l3 Using the populist 
slogan of "Garibi Halao" (Abolish Poverty) to counter the personalised attacks of her 
opponents, Indira was able to reach over the heads of the party bosses and power 
brokers in the states and appeal to a broader national issue, a "total strategy"' of a war 
against poverty.2l-l Standing in her way were the ""forces of reaction", the Old 
Congress and its allies, which threatened to disrupt the democratic socialism 
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represented by the new, more stridently ideological Congress (R).~15 In addition. the 
victory over Pakistan in the war for the liberation of Bangladesh fuelled the nationalist 
fervour of a resurgent India.216 Combined with the attacks on the privy purses and the 
nationalization of the banks (discussed in Chapter 5) the victory contributed to the 
massive groundswell of support for Indira Gandhi's leadership. By promising to 
transform the economic make-up of the country. she single-handedly led the Congress 
(R) to victory. 
The Indira Wave phenomenon is contentious. Several authors. among them. 
Vanderbok. (1990) insist that the "Indira Waves" were not solely the responsibility of 
Gandhi hersel(~17 In order to properly understand this trend. one needs to look back to 
the elections of 1967. The surge in opposition support in 1967 was primarily due to 
the increased ability of these parties to entice new voters into the system, most of 
whom voted against the Congress (which led to the slump in Congress support as 
explained in Chapter 4). However, the ability of the opposition parties to retain these 
new voters was weak: 
The near collapse and realignment of 1967 was no collapse at all. The 
Congress continued to get 24 percent of the electorate. Overall mobilization 
surged another 6 percent however, and all of this increase went to the 
opposition parties. The supposed populist realignment of 1971. instead of 
being an Indira wave. saw the party mobilize 23 percent of the electorate. 
down 1 percent from four years earlier. OveralL however, mobilization 
dropped 6 percent, nearly all of it from the opposition ranks. The result was an 
~18 
apparent but not reaL Congress surge.-
The large fluctuations in Congress and opposition support between the two elections 
fed the misperception that Mrs. Gandhi was the sole agent of her party·s success.219 
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Rather. the apparent surge for Congress in 1971 can be attributed to the ebb in support 
for a disorganised and clannish opposition that failed to get out the votes. 
The ideological swing to the left. if it is to be cited as a valid explanation for the 
heightened Congress support, should be seen in light of the fact that opposition parties 
of both the right and left lost equally as badly to the Congress (R).220 This implies that 
Congress (R) did not win merely because it appealed to the left. Nor was it the case 
that centrist politics were dominant at the time: as illustrated by the relative successes 
of the parties of the extreme left (such as the CPI-M) and the extreme right (Jan 
Sangh).~21 Again. the explanation is that the hidebound opposition failed to persuade 
those disatTected with Congress rule to come out and vote - and to vote for them. 
Given these facts. it is clear that the Congress victory was due less to the boldness of 
its leader than it was to the shortcomings of her opponents. A key failing in this regard 
was the Grand Alliance·s continued vilitication of Indira Gandhi herself one of the 
few issues in the alliance on which there was agreement.~~~ By doing so, the four 
parties focused their attention on her leadership and character and gave substance to 
the view that the Congress (R) was the only viable national party. The smearing and 
negative campaigning indirectly bolstered the image of the Congress. Under its 
charismatic leader Congress looked programmatically coherent and genuine In its 
claims to transform Indian society ~ juxtaposed with an opposition that could only 
conjure up slander and invective?23 One might assume that the multiregional and 
ideological heterogeneity of the Grand Alliance would have been able to project a 
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more holistic national image. one that cut across caste and linguistic loyalties. but this 
was not to be the case. Contra 1967. the parochial issues of individual states took on 
less importance. In addition. the unpredictable flurry of defections and failed 
provincial governments led many to doubt the regional parties' ability to hold 
office.22-l The electorate's desire for strong national leadership swept the Congress to 
povver with a renewed mandate. 225 The decline in Congress dominance appeared to 
have been checked. 
6.3. Pressures from Within and Without 
i. Pressures from Within 
Despite the triumph at the polls, the new ideological shift and the deep personalization 
of politics under Indira Gandhi had serious implications for the internal operation of 
the party organisation. As Joshi and Desai note, a marked change in the articulation of 
the goals of the system had taken place: 
In the earlier Dominance model. consensus-making by accommodating 
various interests was itself a critical value: conflict avoidance and group-
accommodation were preferred even at the cost of ideological coherence and 
effectiveness of performance. But in the new model economic performance 
was accorded high priority. Ideological thrust was more clear-cut and forceful 
with "Garibi Hatao" (Abolish Poverty) becoming a great mobilizing force ... 
There was more stress on ideological coherence. more intolerance toward 
dissenters. and more determination to push ahead even at the risk of 
jeopardizing the party consensus.226 
The assiduously crafted left-populist tone - so effective in energlsmg voters and 
wmnmg elections - was designed to break the dependence on the established 
agricultural elites (who occupied a position analogous to the Kulaks of Russia). In the 
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established system. landed farmers gave conditional support to the largely 
autonomous and powerful state bosses. returning the Congress (R) to power in 1971, 
but also obstructing reform of the inequitable rural economy. Centralizing power was 
the only way Indira Gandhi perceived that she could dismantle this relationship and 
initiate her ··progressive" measures.~~7 In order to succeed in this. she attempted to 
divert the mobilisational capacity of the Congress (R) towards the radical student and 
youth groups that had assisted in her election campaign. These ··now seemed 
appropriate as vehicles of patronage distribution to garner support for the otherwise 
unanchored new loyalists. Thus a countervailing structure of urban and rural support 
was attempted so that the strongholds of the older elite. in control of local power 
structures. could be infiltrated:·~~8 However. by favouring these alternative networks 
(and increasing. for instance. the role of the Pl\Ii"s Secretariat2~9) she alienated state 
bosses through unilateral decision-making that ""bypassed established modes of 
reconciling tension and conflict within the party system:·~3() Confrontation with these 
old associations was now favoured over consensus and intolerance and polarization 
"'I grew.-~ 
In the new dominance model, the tradition of "internal democracy' deteriorated 
rapidly. The marked attenuation of the competitive process was evident in Mrs. 
Gandhi·s manipulation and suppression of local party bosses. as well as her 
intolerance for factions.~3~ Fearing the emergence of potentially threatening bases of 
power. Gandhi went to great lengths to quash support for candidates who were not of 
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her O'vvn choosing. By appointing Chief Ministers and PCC presidents herselt: these 
leaders became beholden to the Prime Minister. rather than their provincial 
legislatures or party units. The indirect result of this concentration of power was that. 
the new Congress pyramid of command. instead of facilitating the emergence 
of a new. stable. and effective state leadership with a strong local base of 
support. was deliberately manipulating Congress factionalism to prevent a 
healthy consolidation of power in the states. The result was weak. ineffective, 
and inept leadership incapable of dealing with the mounting economic 
hardship of the population.233 
Presently. Congress was run in a submissive and hierarchical fashion. A culture of 
sycophancy prevailed among its members who deferred to the directives of their 
superiors. Accordingly, Indira Gandhi gained short-tenn control over the operation of 
her party and its ideological trajectory. However. what she lost \vas far greater: the 
long-term sustainability of the party machine. This new political culture of capricious 
decision-making coupled with the weakening of institutions was. according to 
Kochanek. ··unable to manage the tensions and cleavages of a heterogeneous party 
operating in a heterogeneous society. federally governed:· The top-down strategy of 
leadership was destined to fail because the central command was unable to manage 
the myriad challenges at the provincial and district level - the base was too broad for 
it to do so. Consequently. ··a major crisis in the system followed:·n .. 
Horizontal competition also suffered under the new dominance system. The ability of 
the party apparatus to challenge the executive ann of the government was maligned as 
anti-national and treasonous. No longer were dissenting voices considered a necessary 
feature of incumbency. Party building was neglected. and the organisational structures 
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that had for so long kept the government in check became subservient to the Prime 
Minister's office.~35 
ii. Pressures from Without 
Outside of the party arena. several external forces were building against the Congress 
(R) that would contribute to the party's decline into authoritarian rule. The highfalutin 
promises of the 1971 elections aroused the expectations of the electorate vis-a-vis the 
ability of the Congress to deliver substantive change and alleviate poverty.~36 In 
effect. Congress created much of its own trouble by disrupting the channels of 
communication with leaders in the states and stalling the distribution of resources and 
the implementation of policy reform as discussed above. 
Following the elections of 1971. Indira Gandhi faced a legal challenge from her 
opponent in the Rae Bareilly parliamentary constituency in Uttar Pradesh. Indignant 
at his defeat. Mr. Raj Narain, a Socialist leader in the state. launched a case of 
corruption before the Allahabad court.237 After several years of testimonies and 
deliberations. the court finally pronounced on 12 June 1975 that Mrs. Gandhi had 
been found guilty on two counts of electoral malpractice. nullifying her victory. Both 
convictions concerned the inappropriate use of government civil servants in the 
national campaign. as well as in the Uttar Pradesh election.~38 The judge of the case, 
Justice Sinha. although dismissing additional allegations of bribery. nevertheless 
declared Gandhi's election illegitimate under the Representation of the People Act of 
2" Joshi. & Desai. p. 110 I 
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1951 and ordered her immediate resignation from her seat in the Lok Sabha.23 'J She 
\\as therefore also required to vacate the office of the Prime Minister. plunging the 
country into political turmoil. 
Despite her conviction. a recalcitrant Indira Gandhi refused to step down. preferring. 
on the advice of her legal council and cabinet ministers. to file an appeal in the 
S ".+0 h'l ., . upreme Court.- Meanw I e. a grOWIng chorus ot voices in civil society. the 
professions and the youth were calling for her abdication. However. with the 
Congress' fate so tightly bound to her own. and with no evident successor. Indira 
Gandhi chose to cling to power.24I She received a modest concession from the 
Supreme Court when Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer granted her a 'conditional stay', which 
allowed her to continue as PM, but prevented her from voting in parliament or 
d · ".j" rawIng a salary.- -
To add to the party's woes, the day after Indira's conviction state elections in Gujarat 
produced a Congress (R) 10ss?B The months preceding the elections witnessed a 
spontaneous uprising by students disillusioned with the ineptitude of the Congress 
government in the West Indian state.244 The student-led riots and civil unrest had 
eventually led to the dissolution of the state ministry and its legislative assembly. The 
chief minister Chimanbhai Patel was forced to resign, and President's Rule was 
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implemented.~-l5 In order to prolong the President" s Rule ordinance and side-step the 
need for fresh elections. Mrs. Gandhi avoided reconstituting the government by citing 
the continued bloodshed that had gripped the state for ten weeks - and the loss of 103 
lives - as sufficient grounds for postponement. But she was forced to continue with 
the vote when Congress (R) MPs and their families were physically intimidated and 
Morarji Desai threatened a "fast unto death" if the election was not held. ~-l6 Despite 
vigorous campaigning by Indira on behalf of her party. Congress went down by 12 
seats (receiving only 75 seats in an assembly of 182) to the opposition coalition. the 
People's Front (Janata Morcha).'2-l7 The Gujarat uprising was a "political watershed" 
according to Frankel as "[it] marked the collapse of shared consensus on legitimate 
methods of conflict resolution between the government and opposition groups:·2-lS 
Although barely noticed amidst the furore over the PM's legal troubles. the electoral 
defeat in Gujarat reflected the growing dissatisfaction with the government at all 
levels of administration.2-l9 Such was the proliferation of corrupt officials, black 
money. and the "growing insensitivity on the part of the operators of the system to the 
mounting hardships of the people and their scant regard for the rules of the democratic 
game." ~50 The new form of dominance was akin to an upside-down pyramid 
balancing on its tip. Unlike the old Congress pyramid with its broad base of ideologies 
and factions dispersed throughout the party structure. Congress' power now hinged 
solely on the legitimacy of its central leadership. When the tip \vas threatened the 
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pyramid became unstable and the dependent party organisation was incapable of 
correcting the imbalance. Collapse was imminent. 
Congress was to face a relentless challenge in the form of the "JP Movement"'. The 
title invoked the name of Jayaprakash Narayan. who led the campaign. One of the 
most revered figures in Indian public life, "JP" was a Gandhian socialist (sarvodaya). 
an advocate of non-violent revolution and a veteran of the liberation struggle. The 72-
year-old was seen as a man of unassailable moral integrity and his return to active 
political life to oppose the Congress government after many years in self-imposed 
isolation had a palpable effect on popular attitudes towards Indira's 
maladministration.:5l In his native state of Bihar. mass protests and an often violent 
student uprising had gripped the state (buoyed by the events in Gujarat earlier in the 
year). Although condemning the violence. Narayan made overtures to the student 
leadership and began building support in late 1974. His call to reform the educational 
and electoral systems and to overhaul the bureaucratic strangulation of an incompetent 
political order in one of India's poorest regions was well received.:5::: He vowed a 
"struggle against the very system which has compelled almost everybody to go 
J P' s radical proposals for .. total revolution" soon expanded into a general ised 
denunciation of the Congress (R) administration, calling for the dissolution of the 
state assembly and the resignation of the ministry.:5-+ Disparaged by the Congress 
leadership. the increasingly national movement was able to make substantial gains by 
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drawing on disparate elements such as the Hindu conservatives the RSS. Jana Sangh 
and Anand Marg. as well as left radicals the CPl (M) and several Naxalite groups.~55 
Adding to the government's woes was the call for a general strike of 1.7 million 
railway workers by the All-India Railwaymen's Federation (AARF). The strike 
pressured for greater increases in wages. annual bonuses and subsidisation of essential 
commodities. beyond the capacity of an already strained fiscus.~56 The strike was met 
by the central government as a direct political challenge and citing the Defence of 
India rules (DIR). it was declared illegal. Under the preventative detention clause of 
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MlSA) the leader of the union. George 
Fernandes. was arrested along with hundreds of other union members. After 20 days 
the strike was crushed, with over 20 000 workers behind bars.~57 Following this, the 
breakdown in contlict resolution and the contempt for due process was spectacularly 
displayed with the assassination of L.N. Mishra. the Railways Minister. in a bomb 
blast at a train platform in Samastipur. Bihar. in January 1975 (killing several 
bystanders). The assassination was the first of its kind against a national minister 
since the birth of the Republic.~58 
Mass action continued for many months under the leadership of JP Narayan, 
culminating in a march of over a hundred thousand people to Parliament House III 
Delhi on 6 March 1975 whereupon a "Charter of Demands" was delivered to the 
government.~5l) The organisational power of the movement and its ability to mobilize 
popular sentiment against the Congress was on display in Gujarat. Here key alliances 
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were made with opposition groups and the insurgent student organisations to defeat 
the ruling party at the provincial polls in June. 
The protests intensified throughout that month. peaking during the "double shock" of 
the court ruling and the Gujarat elections. The tipping point of the political crisis was 
at hand. and it was a mere two weeks after the June 12th High Court ruling that Indira 
Gandhi took decisive action. Speaking publicly at a protest rally. Narayan was overly 
vocal in his calls for Indira to resign. appealing to the police and the military to 
disobey the orders of an illegitimate Prime Minister. This was taken as an incitement 
of the armed forces to rebellion and a direct atfront to the government. Unwittingly. 
JP's civil disobedience campaign had lit the fuse of the Emergency. 
6.4. The Emergency 
On 26 July 1975, Indira Gandhi announced to the nation that a State of Emergency 
had been declared by President Fakhruddin 'Ali Ahmed. at her instigation. Under 
Article 352 of the Constitution the PM was entitled to suspend parliamentary 
government and declare emergency rule in the event of "a threat to the security of 
India by war. external aggression. or armed rebellion:·26o Indira cited the latter 
criterion to justify the imposition of the Emergency by defending the integrity of the 
nation against "disruptive forces .. 26I : 
The President has proclaimed an emergency. This is nothing to panic about. I 
am sure you are conscious of the deep and widespread conspiracy which has 
been brewing ever since I began to introduce certain progressive measures of 
benefit to the common man and woman of India. In the name of democracy it 
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has been sought to negate the very functioning of democracy ... How can any 
government worth the name stand bv and allmv the country's stabilitv to be 
~ '11 d "6" • _. lmpen e ?~ -
So began a period of bureaucratic authoritarian rule of an unprecedented nature. 
Immediate action was taken against opposition members. 200 of whom were arrested. 
along with dissidents within the Congress.263 Morarji Desai. JP Narayan. Asoka 
Mehta26-+, Raj Narain. Piloo Mody. Jyotirmoy Basu. et ([/ were jailed.265 In addition, 
the forthcoming elections of 1976 were postponed indetinitely. with several political 
groups being outlawed.266 The right of habeas corpus was removed and thousands of 
"insurgents" were arrested with little effort made to inform the public of the reasons 
for. or whereabouts of. their detention. Many other civil liberties were suspended. 
including the freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to life and property was 
treated 100sely.267 The press were also prevented from issuing statements critical of 
the Prime Minister and her government. and foreign reporters were ordered to 
leave.268 
Soon after the declaration, in July 1975 Indira Gandhi unveiled the Twenty-Point 
Programme. The programme set out a list of social changes that were to become the 
ofticial justification and manifesto for the Congress during the Emergency to 
accelerate social change.269 The programme consisted of. inter alia. the abolition of 
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bonded labour. the liquidation of rural indebtedness. income tax reform. as well as 
forceful prohibitions on illegal smuggling and land speculation.270 
In a short time. the Emergency rulings succeeded in bringing about stability in the 
country. Civil servants. at risk of losing their jobs. were more punctual and efficient 
than ever before (amusingly. the increase in attendance led to a sudden lack of desk 
chairs at government bureaus).271 Under the Emergency the proverbial trains ran on 
time. The universities were no longer hotbeds of unrest. industrial mass action ceased. 
and the administration of government improved. Illegal traders. smugglers and 
hoarders were punished and the black market was largely quashed.272 
But the costs associated with these benetits were great. One of the most ambitious 
projects of the Emergency was that of family planning. The explosion of the Indian 
population had placed an enormous burden on the infrastructure and resources of the 
country. In April 1976, the National Population Policy was announced. which set a 
target of reducing the annual natality rate of 35 births per thousand people to 25 per 
thousand.273 To do this, the legal age of marriage was raised and money or goods 
(such as transistor radios) were otTered as incentives for men to get sterilised. Indira 
Gandhi brushed aside accusations that the cost of the programme on people's 
individual liberty \vas too high. "We should not hesitate to take steps which might be 
described as drastic. Some personal rights have to be kept in abeyance". she said.27.f 
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The government eventually achieved its goals. performing over 7 million operations 
in 1976 alone.~75 
The administration of the programme was horribly crude. and civil servants, 
particularly those in the rural reaches of the country. often resorted to coercive 
measures to meet their quotas. There were widespread reports of round-ups of men 
who were forced to undergo the vasectomy~76 (although these reports only appeared in 
the foreign. rather than the local media). The suppression of information did not do 
enough to stop the spread by word of mouth of the personal violations being exercised 
by the state. In turn, the capricious manner in which the project was executed led to 
many cases of violent resistance. which sometimes involved police shootings and 
fatal ities. ~77 
The sterilization campaign was a good example of the blatant disregard for civil 
liberties under the Emergency by trampling on the reproductive rights of the citizens 
for the good of the greater whole. The effect that 'family planning' had on the 
perception of the Congress government was manifestly negative. This was particularly 
so among Muslims and Untouchables as well as rural village dwellers who were most 
directly affected by the programme and its prejudiced administrators.278 Predictably. 
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the vvealthy and those well connected to the ruling party enjoyed a cloak of immunity 
from the humiliation of state intervention into the private realm. 
Another disastrous initiative orchestrated under the Emergency was the 
"beautification" of the cities, mainly in the metropolitan areas of Delhi and 
Bombay.279 Beautification involved the planting of hundreds of thousands of trees -
but also the mass removal of urban slums. The forced clearances of informal 
settlements were a tremendous upheaval to a number of the poor and disadvantaged 
that Mrs. Gandhi claimed as her key constituency. 
The influence of Sanjay Gandhi, the Prime Minister's son. was particularly insidious. 
His personal involvement in both the slum clearances as well as the sterilisations 
meant his notoriety grew rapidly. His closeness to his mother meant that he was the 
chief advisor and intermediary between the PM and her subordinates and he 
increasingly acted with contempt towards any constitutional limitations.28o His 
influence was so strong that he even managed to sideline the influential PM's 
Secretariat making himself: an un-elected representative. responsible for major policy 
decisions.281 Seen as an heir apparent in the Gandhi dynasty. one of Sanjay's main 
successes was the building of the Congress Youth. of which he was the chairman. A 
mass-based movement. the Congress Youth would hold frequent rallies and draw 
crowds of hundreds of thousands, and were the chief ce lebrators of the Emergency. In 
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many ways the youth movement supplanted the parent organisation In its mass 
The Emergency may be seen as the ultimate exercIse In state power. but for the 
Congress. it was a desperate attempt to confront the decline in legitimacy that they 
faced in the country. Compounding these problems was the organisational ossification 
and the sectarian thinking that had jeopardised Congress' ability to substantively alter 
the lives of the poor. As Frankel observes: 
Mrs. Gandhi's own credibility. and by extension. that of the democratic 
political process over which she presided. had become inextricably linked to 
promises for the implementation of radical economic reform through 
parliamentary means. Under the best of circumstances. these promises could 
not be easily reconciled. Under conditions of an organisational vacuum in the 
states and ideological polarisation at the Centre. both within the ruling party 
and between the government and the opposition. such pledges were impossible 
to redeem.283 
Fortunately. the period of authoritarian rule was somewhat short-lived. only lasting 19 
months. However. the effects of the Emergency were devastating, profoundly 
impacting on the collective consciousness of the citizenry. In the next chapter we 
examine how the Emergency came to an end and we will seek to understand the most 
critical of India's elections: those of 1977. 
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7. END OF THE EMERGENCY & 
THE ELECTIONS OF 1977 
7.1. The End of the Emergency 
7.2. The Janata Campaign & Victory 
7.3. Critically Evaluating the Congress Loss 
"There are none so blind as those who will not see:' 
- J;fahatma Gandhi 
1977 was an historic year in Indian politics and a dramatic denouement for the 
Congress party in office. This was the year in which the authoritarian experiment of 
the previous 19 months was put to an end and the long-awaited elections were held. 
For voters. a major decision was at hand: stick with the Congress party and validate 
the new oppressive measures for the sake of law, order and stability: or support the 
opposition in an anti-Congress alliance to re-assert the constitutional framework and 
the freedoms of expression. association. and equality before the law. 
The result was staggering. In a moment of profound democratic expressIOn voters 
rejected the Congress government and its high-handed rule for a new opportunity in 
the form of the Janata Party. The once mighty Congress. the party of liberation, of 
Nehru and Gandhi. the symbol of modern India for thirty years. was voted out of 
office. The precipitous decline of the dominant party had finally come to a head. But 
hmv had this come to pass? 
What follows is an attempt to answer this simple question by looking first at the 











(Related to this is why the Congress. and Indira Gandhi in particular. chose to rescind 
the Emergency and host elections in the first place). The second task is to understand 
the make-up of the Janata Party. how they came to be the custodians of the anti-
Congress sentiment that had been building for so long. and the forces that drove them 
to victory (section 6.2). Section 6.3 will look at the roots of the disdain shown towards 
Congress and how their loss came about. 
7.1. The End of the Emergency 
As 1976 was drawing to a close the Emergency was becoming routinised and the 
small achievements of the initial months - curbing criminality, eliminating 
inefficiency in the civil service and alleviating economic stagnation - were beginning 
to regress.28 -+ Therefore elections had to be held earl)' to maximise the gains of the 
Emergency. 
Why would a party with such authoritarian leanings choose to expose itself to a 
potential loss of power by risking elections? Some possible explanations are apparent. 
Perhaps Mrs. Gandhi was trying to legitimise the Emergency through the ballot box; 
to justify the extreme measures that were needed to counter extreme threats. Another 
consideration is that the prominence of the Youth Congress had created intra-party 
contradictions that it was hoped would be overcome by giving prominent youth 
members an institutionalised role in the parent organisation.285 Likewise. there was 
the need to have Sanjay Gandhi elected as a member of parliament to enable him to 
2S.j }.iarain. I.: ··India 1977: From Promise to Disenchantment?·· .-Is;al1 SlIrve\'. Vol. 18. No.2. (Feb .. 
1978). p. 106 












channel his support with the Youth Congress into official power.~36 Harvests that year 
\,iere healthy and there was a general decline in food prices. \vhich may have led 
Gandhi and her officials to think that circumstances favoured calling an election.287 
Added to this was the need to counter the mounting international criticism of the 
Emergency which was beginning to damage the perception of India abroad. Mostly 
hmvever. there was a genuine belief by Indira Gandhi that the elections were in fact 
winnable: such was the level of sycophancy from the aides and ministers surrounding 
her. 288 With dissent now seen as a direct challenge to leadership, those close to the 
prime minister were unwilling or unable to voice views that were at odds with her 
own. and the decision to hold elections went uncontested. None of those close to Mrs. 
Gandhi had constituencies that they could dra\v upon to channel feelings and 
grievances towards the prime minister. as she had hand-picked them all. 
Although calls by the opposition for elections had continued for months. the decision 
to hold them was unexpected. and Indira gave little time - barely six weeks - to 
prepare for the contest.289 The strategy was to give a small allocation of time that 
would obstruct the opposition campaign. In preparation. opposition leaders were 
released from prison. and the draconian censorship laws on the press were lifted. 
allowing them to freely criticise?90 
:Sb Ibid. 
:S- Ibid. 
:S8 "iarain. p. 107 
:SO \\ einer. "The 1977 Parliamentary Elections in India .. ·. p. 620 











7.2. The Janata Campaign and Victory 
Shortly after the elections were declared. four opposition parties announced that they 
would be running in an alliance known as the Janata Party. The alliance consisted of 
the Jan Sangh (the atavistic Hindu organisation). the Bharatiya Lok Dal (a regional 
party confined to the North) as well as the Socialists and the Congress (0). This was 
an unusual occurrence for Indian politics because the opposition had failed to 
successfully come together in the past. However. the threat of the Emergency 
becoming entrenched if the Congress were to win was enough to galvanise the 
disparate groups to act together. The short space of time before the elections also 
created a sense of urgency: that the opposition ought to act in concert or fail to 
291 remove Congress. 
Apart from Narayan (who did not contest otTice) leading figures in the alliance 
included Morarji Desai, Indira's old rival. and leader of the Congress (0). An 
important defection occurred when Jagjivan Ram. a long-serving Indira ally and 
cabinet minister. resigned from his government post and left the Congress (R). He 
condemned the Emergency and publicly revealed that intra-party democracy had all 
but evaporated. Chief ministers, he said, were no longer chosen through the elected 
assemblies but through the PM's office. which was also now determining the 
appointment of party ofticials.292 With the elections approaching. this was a 
significant loss for the Congress as Mr. Ram had a large following of people in Bihar. 
:"1 'vVeiner. ··The 1977 Parliamentary Elections in India:'. p. 615 











his native state. Moreover. being a Harijan himself he enjoyed much loyalty among 
Untouchable voters. of whom there were millions throughout the country.2<.J3 
In the build-up to the elections the Janata campaign began to actively engage with the 
various disaffected groups who had suffered under the authoritarian climate. Janata 
had no unifying ideology save for the desire of all its members to see Congress 
removed from office and the Emergency revoked. and in this way it was an 
. . II' "94 opportunIstic a lance.-
On what basis did people vote? The election was billed as an issue-oriented election; a 
question of dictatorship versus democracy. or stability versus chaos. Narain (1978) on 
the other hand. argues that the election was not merely a contestation over abstract 
political values or issue-orientation.295 Rather. it showed the vituperative reaction that 
people had to the impositions on their personal freedom under the Emergency. The 
forced removals. the arrogance of the arbitrary power exercised by bureaucrats. and 
the violation of the sterilisation campaign were all keenly felt among the population. 
The direct etTect on ordinary citizens showed the fragility of fundamental rights to 
shield against abuses of power, and the elections were a re-assertion of the value of 
these protections. 
The Congress government was comprehensively rejected. Janata. allying with the 
Akali Dal.296 the Congress for Democracy (the breakaway group of Congress 
:0; Weiner. "The 1977 Parliamentary Elections in India". p. 620 
:q~ Joshi & Desai. p. I 103 
:," l\iarain. I.: "India 1977: From Prom ise to Disenchantment?" .-!sian Survey. Vol. 18. No.2. (Feb .. 
1978). p. 106 
:°6 The .\kali Dal is the principal political organisation of the Sikhs in the Punjab. \\here it has been 











dissidents under Jagjivan Ram) and the CPI (M) won a total of 328 out of 542 seats in 
the national assembly. exceeding the 153 seats gained by Congress by a large 
margin. 297 In northern India in particular, the results were devastating. Congress won 
onh 5 out of 290 seats in 8 of the main states in that region (compare this to the 192 
they gained in 197 I ).298 Many observers of Indian politics hailed the result as a 
"virtually unprecedented restoration of a democratic system by popular vote and as a 
confirmation of the deep commitment of the Indian populace. rich and poor alike. to 
the values of democracy and parliamentarism:·299 
Looking at the results. it is clear that the victory was not solely to do with the unified 
front offered by the alliance, but rather a tangible shift by voters a\Vay from the 
Congress. The margin of victory in certain areas was very high. Mrs. Gandhi lost her 
constituency by over 50 000 votes. George Fernandes. the trade unionist who 
campaigned from jaiL won his constituency by 330 000 votes. 300 Persecution of 
individuals like Fernandes could only have helped to bolster their credibility as 
fighters in ajust struggle. 
The success of the Congress (R) was so closely tied to the fortunes of its leader, and 
Indira's rule so deeply personalised. that when her popularity began to wane. so too 
did her party·s. Despite embarking on an aggressive nationwide tour, Indira was 
incapable of campaigning everywhere. Sanjay took a ditTerent approach. limiting 
himself to his own constituency. but his charisma was not utilised outside of Uttar 
See Brass. "The Politics of India Since Independence:'. p.92. 
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- Weiner. "The I 977 Parliamentary Elections in India .... p. 622 
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8 Blair. p. 260 
2'''' Brass. P.: ··Congress. the Lok Da!. and the Middle-Peasant Castes: An Analysis of the 1977 and 
1980 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh" Pacific .-Jjjclirs. Vol. 5-1-. ]\;0. I. (Spring. 1981). p. 6 











Pradesh. Compared to the vast reach of the Janata leaders. the Congress (R) 
candidates could not match them in national campaigning. 30 ! With the local party 
structures practically defunct. Congress was reliant solely on the charismatic authority 
of their leader and her tested ability to draw votes. This time hovvever. it was not 
enough. 
Congress managed to salvage some support in the south. with large majorities In 
states such as Andhra Pradesh. This can be partially explained by JP Narayan's 
inability to penetrate the region and his focus on the northern belt. It may have been 
that the sterilisation units were less active in the south. and the sheer distance between 
Delhi and many of the southern states meant that the coercive measures of the 
. 30' Emergency were less keenly felt In these areas. - However. there were other reasons 
why Congress retained many of the southern states. Mendelsohn notes that many of 
the regional parties with which Janata was aligned in the south were experiencing 
declining popularity. such as the DMK in Tamil Nadu.303 The family planning disaster 
was not as pronounced in Orissa for instance. 
Although Janata was successful in the urban areas it does not follow that they 
performed miserably in the countryside. Those who thought that the average peasant 
vvould not care for the abstract liberal principles that had been so steadily eroded since 
1975 vvere mistaken. Many rural villages had first-hand experience of the arbitrary 
exercise of authority by malicious bureaucrats who had little care for accountability to 
,ill Wt:int:r. "Tht: 1977 Parliamt:ntary Ekctions in India:'. p. 622 












those they governed. These officials were also no longer beholden to the local elites 
who usually had jurisdiction over the civil service in these areas?).) 
Congress made some significant errors of judgement in the build-up to the election, 
one of the biggest being the arrest of JP Narayan. The perception of Narayan as a 
paragon of social justice and a steadfast democrat and Gandhian apostle fanned the 
flames of indignation at his arrest. This was particularly so in the northern countryside 
'0-
where he was most popular.~ ) 
Upon their victory, Janata immediately legislated for the dissolution of the Emergency 
and its restrictive measures by recalling parliament. lifting the censorship laws and 
releasing the last of the political prisoners.306 They also legislated for stricter controls 
to make imposing Emergencies more difficult in future. Janata's triumph was no less 
remarkable for the fact that it came from the ballot box, with no violence or sudden 
reversals by those in power. Morarji Desai was finally anointed Prime Minister 
fulfilling his life-long ambition. The restoration of constitutional democracy was at 
hand. 
The Janata government would not last long. In power for barely two years, the 
alliance soon unravelled because of the petty rivalries of the three leaders who each 
strove to manipulate the others to their wishes. Despite its brevity, however. the 
Janata success had made one thing clear: the single party dominant system had come 
to an end. 
;n.j Ibid. p. 62 
,0' Weiner. "The 1977 Parliamentary Elections in India:'. p. 623 











7.3. Critically Evaluating the Congress Loss 
For scholars and journalists at the time. the loss in 1977 represented the end of the 
Congress System and the beginning of an ill detined two-party system?)7 This 
assessment was correct insofar as it signalled the end of the single party dominant 
model with a core party of consensus operating in conjunction with peripheral parties 
of pressure. The ultimate threshold had been crossed: electoral defeat at the national 
level. Hovvever, this was not the beginning of a two party system: this would only 
come much later. The rapid unravelling of the Janata alliance meant that the factitious 
politics of the opposition would return, and so too would the Congress to office. albeit 
with new limits on its power. Following yet another split in the Congress (R) which in 
1978 became the Congress (I) - for Indira - they were voted back into power. Indira 
Gandhi oversaw a corrupt and lacklustre administration until 1984 when she was 
assassinated at the hands of her Sikh bodyguards. 308 
After her death. Indira's other son, Raj iv Gandhi the apolitical commercial jet pilot 
was dragged into politics by a stale Congress party that could think of no better than 
to extend the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Rajiv went some way towards reviving the 
30~ Joshi & Desai. p. 1091 
i08 After the loss of the Punjab in 1977 to the Akali Da!. Congress (\) lent its support to a Sikh 
extrem ist organisation in an effort to outdo its rivals in the state. L'nder the charismatic young preacher 
Jamail Singh Bhindranwale the organisation snowballed into a separatist mmement advocating an 
independent Sikh state or ·Khalistan·. Typical!) Sikhism shirks fundamentalism. but Brindranwale's 
support gre\\ as his tactics became more severe. These included assassinations of prominent Punjabi 
Congressmen as \vell as the murder of clean-shaven Sikhs and anti-Khalistan dissenters. After 
OCCuP) ing the Golden Temple. the most cherished holy site of the religion. the separatists terrorised the 
cit) of Amritsar for months. As the situation escalated. Indira overpla) ed her hand by sending in the 
armed forces in v\hat became known as "Operation Blue Star"' - violating the complex and causing 
\\idespread damage. Brindranwale and his gunmen \\ere killed. but so too \\ere many innocent temple-
goers. Lnderestimating the backlash against her. Indira kept her Sikh bodyguards as a shO\\ of faith. 
This \vould prove a fatal error of judgement as they would later tum on her \vith their own guns. 
Deepening the traged) of Indira's death. widespread pogroms against Sikhs took place through the 
streets of Delhi. and thousands lost their lives in the sectarian violence. 











agenda of the party but his highly technocratic administration would ultimately fall on 
its sword v,hen the fraudulent arms procurement deal known as the "Bofors Scandal"' 
revealed its susceptibility towards graft. Rajiv would lead the party until his own 
assassination in 1991 by Tamil extremists. So the Congress would govern for many 
years following the 1977 loss, only it would do so in a different environment and with 
repeated interruptions. Its opponents had changed and the expediency of electoral 
coalitions was now apparent. Moreover. the Congress no longer enjoyed a monopoly 
on the nation-building project. 
The result in 1977 was no mere electoral defeat. It was first and foremost an emphatic 
rebuttal of authoritarian government. Secondly. it represented the failure of the old 
consensus and a departure of the Congress from its previous role as an agent of 
economic and political development. and host to a variety of cross cutting political 
persuasions and ideologies. By the 1970s. the emphasis on accommodation and 
developing a strong organisation to temper the power of the executive government 
\vas a thing of the past. As Mendelsohn points out. the organisational capacity of the 
Congress to serve all manner of interests in the polity had been severely undermined: 
There is little doubt that by the mid-seventies Congress had become a tired and 
lazy organization. It had never been organized along cadre lines - it lacked a 
disciplined corps of full-time political workers spread throughout the country -
but there were signs that its members and even leaders were less active in the 
. f' ~ I h h 309 pursUit 0 party goa stan t ey once were. 
The most instructive lesson Mendelsohn reveals is that the rapid centralisation of 
power during the Emergency was fundamentally at odds with the liberal democratic 











frame\vork upon which it was imposed.]IO The weakness of the organisational 
membership to stand up to its leaders at the top of the party hierarchy was worsened 
by the schisms in the party in the late Sixties and the ideological confonnity imposed 
by Indira Gandhi's Socialist agenda. The Emergency fiasco also showed the fragility 
of democratic institutions, with key oversight issues such as the independence of the 
judiciary - and its ability to exert its authority over the executive branch - being 
actively compromised. In the face of enormous party and political pressure to toe the 
line of the national leadership, the legislative assemblies also failed to resist popular 
measures of reform. Just how these important protections became so enfeebled will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter. where we look at the institutional decay that took 
place in the Congress party over this ten year period and how each of these factors 
created a momentum that led inevitably to its relinquishing power. 











8. CONCLUSION: THE DYNAMICS OF DECLINE 
8.1. Strains in the Political Economy 
8.2. The Collapse ofthe Congress System 
8.3. Concluding Remarks 
"All political parties die at last of swallowing their own lies:' 
- Dr. John Arbuthnot 
The last ten years of Congress rule revealed an organisation In decay. with a 
leadership divorced from its constituency and increasingly incapable of solving the 
internal contradictions afflicting the party. Each of the previous chapters dealt with 
the different dynamics of dominant party rule and the specific stages in the Congress 
party's decline: the loss of the first state elections in 1967. the split in 1969. the tumult 
of the 1970s. the Emergency and its aftermath. as well as the rejection of Congress in 
1977. As this timeframe shows, the decline of dominance in India was not brought 
about by a single event, but was part of a prolonged corrosion from within. Over time, 
the party became incapable of meeting new challenges from without. In this final 
chapter. the forces that combined to dislodge the Congress party from power will be 
examined with a view to understanding the long-term patterns responsible for its 
dovinfall. The decline will be explained in terms of the context of the Indian political 












8.1. Strains in the Political Economy 
By the late 1960s India's political economy was sufTering from multiple crises and the 
state's ability to deliver essential goods and services was weakening. Improvements in 
developmental healthcare for children following independence through immunisation 
and nutritional programmes resulted in rapid population growth that quickly exceeded 
the critical mass.3 !! The population increase placed high demands on agricultural 
production. with many hundreds of millions of people in dire need of food and other 
essential commodities. Combined with the rapid growth of the population was the 
slO\ving of the economy in the early 1970s. Inflation of the cost of essential goods and 
food shortages (caused by endemic monsoon failures of 1971-2). interest rate hikes. 
and the global fallout from the oil crisis in 1973 all placed a major strain on the Indian 
economy.;I: 
As these economic pressures intensified. parallel developments occurred in the 
political realm. The promise to release people from the trappings of poverty got 
louder (Garibi Hatao.') as daily subsistence for most Indians became increasingly 
more difficult. 313 Part of the electoral strategy of the Congress party in 1971 was to 
capture the hostile sentiment that the population shovved towards the established 
economic order.3 !4 However. when the economic crises vvorsened the gap between the 
pledges of the party and the delivery capacity of the state grew into an unbridgeable 
chasm. It was a classic example of a crisis of raised expectations from which the 
Congress could not recover . 
. 1 II \\·allace. "India: The Dispersion of Political Po\ver". p. 88 
;1: Frankel. "Crisis of Political Stability". p.341 
) 11 Joshi & Desai. p. I 101. 











8.2. The Col/apse of the 'Congress System' 
The image of the Congress as the author of Independence and the custodian of the 
national project lost cogency as the Indian political economy destabilised. However. 
the loss of legitimacy and the weakened allegiance of the electorate to the values of 
the party were due as much to the absence of important functions within the dominant 
party. The vitality of the organisation was gone. but hmv had this come to be? 
Congress' self-projection as the great centralist collective of the Nehru and Shastri 
years was replaced by Indira's new dogma of socialist class struggle. The system as it 
had operated in the past succeeded by relying on the close relationship between 
landed elites in the countryside and local party barons (combined with urban middle 
class and commercial industrial support in the cities). The system was essentially a 
patronage-distribution empire that enabled party elites to secure financial gain in 
exchange for the delivery of votes during elections. This was disguised under the 
rubric of social egalitarianism and left-leaning economic values. of non-alignment in 
the global contlict of ideologies. and secularism. Working against these grand ideals 
was a conservative status quo system that entrenched an inequitable pattern of 
resource distribution for over a generation. 
The entry of Indira Gandhi saw a sustained attack on this system as she sought to play 
a direct activist role in addressing poverty and underdevelopment. By appealing to the 
electorate with her rousing rhetoric of social transformation and eliminating poverty. 
Indira ensured an electoral mandate by using her charismatic authority to generate 











system of patronage that entrenched the distribution of rewards. However. these 
interventions required strong centralisation. vesting all decision-making capacity in 
the office of the Prime Minister. The exit of the Congress (0) had left a weak party 
organisation that no longer provided the corrective function that it once did. What 
resulted was the supremacy of executive power over party autonomy. As many 
Congressmen stood to lose access to the benefits of state povver Indira had to act 
unilaterally and with impunity to ensure her reforms were successful. The voice of the 
party was subjugated. and the country was ruled by executive decree. 
However. the neglect of party building would turn out to be a crucial failure. By 
alienating the party bosses at the state and district level. Mrs. Gandhi successfully 
removed and isolated the networks that stood in the way of fundamental change (as 
well as potential rivals within the party organisation). However. what she attacked 
\vas necessary for the perpetuation of Congress rule. Loyalists replaced local power 
brokers (such as Chief Ministers and PCC presidents) but their dedication to radical 
transformation was less than their commitment to serving their political master in 
New Delhi. The cost of Indira's crusade was that the system atrophied. losing its 
ability to respond to emerging trends and interest groups at the level of the grass roots. 
This undermined the traditional relationship between the party and the constituency 
that it claimed to serve. 
When Indira's bold promIses remained unfulfilled. the piqued expectations of the 
electorate led to dissatisfaction with Congress rule. Where similar dissatisfaction had 
been tempered in the past by winning over key interest groups. no\\< the systemic 











had undennined their power by quashing dissent and placing cronies rather than local 
'big men' (bare admi) in important positions, No longer were ambitious members 
able to climb the figurative ladder, as power emanated from the top of a fixed and 
unalterable hierarchy, 
The shortsightedness of this new strategy lay in its over-reliance on a charismatic 
leadership to generate support, The success of the personalisation of politics hinged 
on the popularity of Indira Gandhi and her ability to appeal directly to voters to 
guarantee support come election time. However. by neglecting the organisational 
structures of the party the national leader become the repository for all the aspirations 
of the population. As a result. when the government failed to live up to its promises 
Indira's popularity ebbed. Charisma can be a potent device. but it cannot be 
institutionalised, and when the leader falls out of favour this is difficult to rectify. 
The supremacy of Indira Gandhi also contributed towards a culture of sycophancy and 
fear among party members. This led to a breakdown of the communication channels 
that ensured new information percolated to the top and which kept the leadership 
informed of the popularity of policies or of their own shortcomings. Seen in this light. 
the obvious hostility to the family planning programme was not reaching Mrs. Gandhi 
and her coterie. The decision to hold elections in 1977 \vas surely supported by 
officials \vho were unwilling or unable to convey the level of dissatisfaction that many 
felt with Indira Gandhi's leadership. 
That is not to say that Indira Gandhi was the only agent of Congress' decline. Would 











to speculate about this. However. one can interrogate the role of other actors. Hanson 
and Douglas place much responsibility on the role of the Syndicate. which created a 
hostile environment for Indira. who in turn reacted strongly: 
Although [the Syndicate] played a useful role in securing the unopposed 
election of Shastri as Prime Minister. the virtually unconcealed factionalism it 
introduced into the central councils of the party had wrought havoc by the time 
of the 1967 elections ... Thus even before the elections of 1967. the stage was 
set for the subsequent party split. That the split actually occurred when it did. 
however. must be attributed to various ·accidents·. of which Mrs Gandhi's 
personality and ambitions were among the more important.315 
The above passage blames the Syndicate for introducing an "unconcealed 
factionalism" into the operation of the Congress machine. However. Hanson and 
Douglas are assuming that factionalism was absent prior to the coming together of the 
Syndicate. and that all forms of factionalism were detrimental to the health of the 
party. More accurately. the split was caused not by the introduction of factional 
conflict but by its mismanagement. Factions were always present in the Congress 
System. but how these competing entities were accommodated was key. Kothari 
characterised the "elaborate network of factions" as adding to the strength of the party 
by providing an "inbuilt corrective" which "makes [the party] more representative. 
provides flexibility and sustains internal competition:·316 By internal ising interparty 
competition at the intraparty level Congress was able to maintain its dominance and 
include interests that would otherwise have found expression in the opposition. 
(Remember too that opposition parties needed these factions as an entry point into the 
dominant party through the margin a/pressureJ /} 
'I' .. Hanson & Douglas. p. 76 
ilb Kothari. "The Congress 'System' in India". pp. 1163-64 











Factions. however. were volatile forces and when the zero-sum contlicts of the late-
Sixties culminated in a split Congress could no longer serve the function of internal 
competition that it once did. It ceased also to be representative and tlexible and drove 
its former dependents into the arms of the opposition. Whether the Syndicate or the 
Indira faction caused this irretrievable breakdown is moot. but it was the contlict 
resolution mechanism that was broken. 
The failures of Congress in office gave new elites an opportunity to emerge as 
agitators for the marginalized interests in the society. Jacob neatly describes this 
tendency: "Once Congress hegemony was undermined. it unravelled quickly - its 
voters shifted to newly viable niche parties and patronage-seeking voters had a greater 
menu of party options:·318 The growth of regional and communal political movements 
from the 1960s retlected an increased willingness by the opposition to ferment 
identity politics and to resist the inclusive national agenda that Congress represented. 
Ethnic and religious chauvinisms. organised within the boundaries of the 
parliamentary system. would grow exponentially from this point. 
As was emphasised in Chapter 2. the role of the opposition in the dominant party 
system is crucial for how the dominant party exercises control. According to Nyable, 
the situation of left and right opposition parties as alternatives to the centrism of the 
dominant party confines their support to voters on the far ends of the political 
319 Th· I I· spectrum. IS resu ts in a sp It vote that divides the opposition and keeps the 
dominant party in power.3~O "Implicitly:' Nyable reminds us ··the end of dominance 
, I~ 
. Jacob. p.2 












could occur when the left and right succeed in allying against the centre:·321 Congress 
decline exhibited precisely this tendency. The polarisation that emerged after the 
Congress split made the unity of the opposition a more reasonable possibility. The 
lurch to the left by Congress was responsible for the Janata coalition coming together 
as an alliance that controlled the centre. The laten(~v factor described by Kothari sees 
the opposition parties providing a continuous threat to the party of consensus that if it 
loses its consensual character it may suffer a loss of power.322 This was indeed the 
case with the Congress, which sacrificed dialogue and cooperation with other groups 
in favour of a vociferous ideological course. However. this activated the latent 
potential of the opposition by enabling them to appeal to the groups that Congress had 
spurned. By trying to mobilise the poor base (only one part of the electorate) Congress 
lost the support of the middle classes, the professions. religious minorities and the 
backward castes. all of whom flocked to the opposition. The failures were now two-
fold. The failure of delivery to defeat poverty was coupled with the failure of 
patronage to guarantee loyalty. 
This section is titled 'The Collapse of the Congress System' which reflects an 
important aspect of the Indian experience during that time. The fact that the party of 
government lost power is. on its own, an unremarkable event. However. this was no 
ordinary loss. The decline of Congress was accompanied by a fundamental change in 
the party system that Congress had so closely sought to control over the years. No 
longer would the Congress be the central actor. but from here on would fonn part of 
an ensemble of competing interests. The steady rise of Hindu nationalism would come 
to be a considerable force in Indian politics. and the Bharatiya Janata Party's 
':1 Ibid. pA 











challenge as an opposition party of some viability would lead it in 1998 to be the first 
single non-Congress party to hold office without the assistance of an alliance.323 The 
multi-party arrangement that would replace Congress dominance would have its 
problems. A fragmentary system. it put a premium on capturing power. and used 
provisional and inadequate alliances to do SO.32-1 To form an administration required 
the support of other parties in slim majorities. When these parties became disgruntled 
with the administration of power they would withdraw their support. resulting in hung 
parliaments and impotent governments. The new system was still greatly intluenced 
by the Congress party. but overall the loss in 1977 represented the end of the 
normative framework of dominance and no longer required Congress to perform its 
historical role. 
8.3. Concluding Remarks 
Throughout this work many explanations have been given for the Congress' descent 
from power. One of the primary causes of this fall was the personalisation of 
governance under Indira Gandhi. which led to the breakdown of the consensual 
strategies that had existed in the past. The relationship between the centre and the 
locality was vital for sustaining the dominant party's organisational strength. as it kept 
the system flexible to local demands. However. by centralising executive power under 
the person of Mrs. Gandhi the essential relationships between landed elites and party 
bosses in the states were discarded. Consequently. the base of support upon which the 
Congress pyramid rested was removed. 
3:3 For an explanation of the evolution of the BlP from its earl: genesis as the lana Sangh see: 
laffrelot. c.: "J\. Specific Party-building Strateg:: The lana Sangh and the RSS Net\\ork" in Hasan. Z. 
(ed): Parties and Party Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford Lni\ersit\ Press (2002). pp. 216 - 221 











This led to the atrophy of party structures at all levels and the deterioration of the 
horizontal regulatory function between party and state. The earlier defeat of the 
Congress (0) faction was symptomatic of the failure of consensus. and its departure 
rendered the party organisation impotent in its efforts to hold the ministerial wing to 
account. The frustration of the competitive hierarchy. as well as the subsequent 
polarisation of the ideological trajectory is reflective of this trend. and the irruption of 
the Emergency illustrates the dangerous potential of run-away. unchecked executive 
power. Ultimately. the inability of the Congress to relieve its internal tensions and its 
failure to meet the needs of a plural society through federal decision-making severely 
undermined its legitimacy. Combined, these factors caused the party to lose its 
standing as a home for all; as a nationalist movement built on pragmatism and 
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